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Foreword
The Korea Economic Institute (KEI) is pleased to issue the fourth volume 
of its Special Studies series. In contrast with KEI’s other publications, 
which generally take the form of a compilation of relatively short articles 
on analytical and policy issues by a number of authors, this series affords 
individual authors an opportunity to explore in depth a particular topic 
of current interest relating to Korea.
In their study, Dr. Robert Stern and Dr. Kozo Kiyota, both of the 
University of Michigan, utilize the Michigan Model of World Production 
and Trade to assess the economic effects of liberalization of trade barri-
ers by Korea and the United States. In addition to computing the static 
effects of liberalization under several scenarios, they also model some 
dynamic scenarios that allow for changes in foreign direct investment 
and capital formation. As a result of these computations and their analysis 
of other free trade agreements entered into by both countries, they draw 
conclusions regarding both a Korea-U.S. free trade agreement and the 
potential impact of the unilateral removal of trade barriers by the two 
countries and also by all countries included in the model.
KEI is dedicated to objective, informative analysis. We welcome 
comments on this and our other publications. We seek to expand contacts 
with academic and research organizations across the country and would 
be pleased to entertain proposals for other Special Studies.
—Charles L. (Jack) Pritchard
President, Korea Economic Institute
April 2007
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Preface
This study presents an analysis of the bilateral free trade agreement 
(FTA) that is being negotiated between Korea and the United States. 
The bilateral FTA negotiations were notified to the U.S. Congress by 
the United States Trade Representative in February 2006, and formal 
negotiations began in May 2006.1 It is anticipated that the negotiations 
may be completed and the agreement signed before mid-2007, which is 
when the current U.S. presidential negotiating authority expires. Once 
signed, the implementing legislation can be introduced in the U.S. 
Congress at any time.
In Chapter 1, we set out what appear to be the primary objectives of 
the United States and Korea in their pursuit of an FTA. In Chapter 2, we 
review the existing studies of a Korea-U.S. FTA that have been done to 
date. Chapter 3 is devoted to comparative static and dynamic analyses 
of the FTA. We first provide an overview of the features and benchmark 
data of the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade, which is the 
computational general equilibrium (CGE) modeling framework that we 
use to analyze the economic effects of a Korea-U.S. FTA. Thereafter, we 
present the comparative static modeling results for the bilateral removal 
of tariffs and other trade barriers for agricultural products, manufactures, 
services, and all of these combined. This is followed by presentation 
of results of some dynamic computational scenarios that are specially 
1. Details on the periodic bilateral meetings involving the negotiation of a 
Korea-U.S. free trade agreement are available on the official Web sites of 
the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (www.ustr.gov) and the Korean 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (www.mofat.go.kr/me/me_a005/me_
b022/me05_04.jsp).
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constructed to take into account possible changes in capital formation 
that may be generated by the Korea-U.S. FTA. We then draw together 
the main conclusions from the review of previous studies and our own 
computational work.
In Chapter 4, we provide a broader perspective on a Korea-U.S. 
FTA that takes into account alternative negotiating options for the two 
nations. These options include computational analyses of the other FTAs 
that each nation has concluded in recent years and that are currently in 
process. We also calculate the potential effects of the unilateral removal 
of trade barriers by the United States and Korea and the effects of global 
free trade in which all countries or regions covered in the model are as-
sumed to remove their existing trade barriers on a multilateral basis. In 
Chapter 5, we present conclusions and implications for further research 
and policy.
We wish to thank James Lister and the Korea Economic Institute 
for providing the opportunity to undertake this study. Helpful comments 
on an earlier version of the study were provided by Hojin Lee, Keith 
Maskus, and Jeffrey Schott. We wish also to thank Judith Jackson for 
editorial and typing assistance.
Kozo Kiyota gratefully acknowledges financial support from the 
Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) 2006 Postdoctoral 
Fellowships for Research Abroad.
—Kozo Kiyota
Yokohama National University and University of Michigan
—Robert M. Stern
University of Michigan
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Objectives and Main Features 
of a Korea-U.S. 
Free Trade Agreement
In what follows, we set out what appear to be the major U.S. objectives 
in seeking a Korea-U.S. free trade agreement (FTA) and indicate the 
principal issues to be addressed in the negotiations. We then discuss 
Korea’s objectives with regard to the FTA.
U.S. Objectives
On 2 February 2006, United States Trade Representative Rob Port-
man notified the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate 
that the George W. Bush administration intended to initiate free trade 
negotiations with the Republic of Korea. Some of the key points in the 
notification were that an FTA with Korea would:
•      Help foster economic growth and create higher-paying jobs in the 
United States and enable U.S. companies to increase their exports 
of goods and services to Korea and promote bilateral investment;
•      Level the playing field for U.S. exports in Korea by providing 
U.S. products treatment comparable with that which Korea has 
offered its other FTA partners;
•      Provide a unique opportunity to improve further the protection 
that Korea affords to intellectual property, including strengthened 
measures in Korea against the illegal online distribution and 
transmission of copyrighted works;
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•      Provide for regulatory transparency in trade and investment 
matters, including a public comment period, the publication of 
general administrative actions, and other appropriate provisions;
•      Help strengthen Korea’s cooperation with the United States in 
multilateral and regional trade forums; and
•      Further enhance the strong U.S.-Korea regional partnership, 
which is a force for stability and development in Asia, and 
cooperation on military and security matters as well as bolster 
strategic interests in the region.
In pursuing bilateral FTAs, the United States uses a common frame-
work covering the issues to be negotiated with the partners involved. 
This framework, which is patterned after the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiated in 1992–93, has been updated 
and adapted for the new FTAs negotiated in recent years and currently 
in process. Issues covered include:
•      Trade in goods;
•      Customs matters, rules of origin, and enforcement cooperation;
•      Sanitary and phytosanitary measures;
•      Technical barriers to trade;
•      Intellectual property rights;
•      Trade in services;
•      Investment;
•      Electronic commerce;
•      Government procurement;
•      Transparency, anticorruption, regulatory reform;
•      Competition;
•      Trade remedies;
•      Environment;
•      Labor; and
•      State-to-state dispute settlement.
It is evident from the foregoing that a Korea-U.S. FTA reflects a 
myriad of U.S. objectives, with a focus on expanding market access in 
Korea for U.S. goods and services and shaping the regulatory environ-
ment in Korea to conform to U.S. principles and institutions.
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Korea’s Objectives
Choi Seok-young (2006), minister for economic affairs at the embassy 
of Korea in Washington, has stated that an FTA between Korea and the 
United States would:
•      Be commercially significant in terms of trade and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and serve to further the long-standing regional 
and bilateral political and strategic interests of both countries;
•      Broaden Korea’s position to avoid the opportunity cost of exclu-
sion from the general trends of FTAs, achieve a level playing 
field in Korea’s dealings in foreign markets, and enhance Korea’s 
international competitiveness;
•      Keep Korea on a multitrack approach in terms of trade strategy 
and work toward comprehensive FTAs in terms of coverage and 
content and broad geographic coverage with trading partners;
•      Contribute significantly to bilateral trade; increase economic wel-
fare and employment; provide more secure market access; lock 
in a variety of domestic reforms; and generate greater efficiency, 
productivity, and economic growth, possibly motivating other 
countries to pursue preferential trading arrangements with Korea 
and the United States; and
•      Allow Korea to seek longer implementation periods for vulner-
able sectors, particularly agriculture and services, and develop 
domestic programs for adjustment assistance.
Choi Seok-young stressed that time is of the essence in completing 
and signing the FTA before the mid-2007 expiration of the U.S. presi-
dent’s trade promotion authority. The overall package of the FTA must 
be balanced in order to receive the necessary domestic approval in both 
countries. A high level of political will is therefore needed throughout 
the negotiation and ratification processes.
Korea’s objectives in seeking an FTA thus reflect a variety of 
considerations, including a desire to avoid being left out of the general 
trend of FTAs, to secure access to foreign markets and achieve the 
static and dynamic benefits of trade liberalization, to enhance Korea’s 
global competitiveness, and to strengthen Korea’s political and strategic 
alliances.1
1. See Lee and Lee (2005, 44–45) and Schott, Bradford, and Moll (2006, 
2–3) for an elaboration of Korean and U.S. mutual objectives in seeking a 
Korea-U.S. FTA.
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Literature Review of Previous 
Studies of a Korea-U.S. FTA
A number of studies of a Korea-U.S. FTA have been carried out previ-
ously.2 These studies relied on computational general equilibrium (CGE) 
models, which provide an economywide framework for analysis that 
takes into account the interdependencies that exist both within and 
between countries. The framework is essentially microeconomic in 
character. When the CGE models incorporate data covering the sectoral 
production, trade, and employment of the component countries together 
with measures of import tariffs and other forms of trade barriers, it is 
possible to simulate the economic effects of various patterns of trade 
liberalization. The computational results based on the model simula-
tions will then provide estimates of the effects of trade liberalization on 
aggregate economic welfare for individual countries together with the 
impacts on production, trade, and employment at the sectoral levels.
It is important to understand that the CGE modeling simulation 
results provide indications of the potential economic changes involved. 
In this respect, they are not meant to be empirical forecasts or predictions 
of the changes because they are not derived from econometric methods 
that can yield statistically based estimations. Further, because they are 
microeconomic in character, CGE models of necessity abstract from 
the macroeconomic forces at work at the aggregate level in individual 
countries. As a consequence, it may be very difficult to compare CGE 
2. See Barfield (2003, 51–58 and 64–67) for a discussion of the effects of 
proposed bilateral and regional FTAs involving Korea vis-à-vis Japan, the 
United States, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and other selected regions.
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modeling results with the actual changes that occur in the economic 
variables over given periods of time. A further important consideration 
is that CGE models used to analyze the effects of trade liberalization 
may differ because of the assumptions that characterize their framework. 
In any event, CGE modeling results are therefore to be interpreted as 
the potential effects of trade liberalization at the microeconomic level, 
holding macroeconomic influences constant. The magnitudes and direc-
tions of change indicated by the CGE models are thus very useful in 
their own right, subject to the caveats just mentioned.
In the review that follows, the existing studies of a Korea-U.S. FTA 
to be noted have relied on what is commonly referred to as a GTAP 
(Global Trade Analysis Project) model, using different versions of the 
GTAP database and different base years. Typical GTAP models rely on a 
structure of perfect competition with constant returns to scale, and they 
assume that products can be distinguished by national origin. This latter 
assumption is often called the Armington assumption, and, conceptually, 
it affords countries elements of monopoly power that are reflected in their 
tariff rates. As a result, when tariffs are reduced in this framework, there 
may be large terms-of-trade effects as the assumed monopoly power is 
eroded. In our judgment, GTAP models may therefore yield results that 
are not altogether plausible because of their reliance on the Armington 
assumption of national product differentiation. As we note below, the 
Michigan Model, which we will use for our computational analysis 
in Chapter 3, contains features of imperfect competition and product 
differentiation at the firm level that are not captured by typical GTAP-
based models. The Michigan Model thus does not exhibit the often large 
terms-of-trade effects associated with GTAP-based models.
Cheong and Wang (1999)
Cheong and Wang (1999) use a GTAP-type model with 11 regions and 14 
sectors, with apparently version 4 of the GTAP database and a base year 
of 1995. They carry out computational scenarios of a Korea-U.S. FTA 
with 100 percent and 50 percent tariff removal for agriculture products 
and manufactures as well as for a Korea-Japan FTA and a situation in 
which Korea would join NAFTA. For complete tariff removal for ag-
ricultural products and manufactures, Cheong and Wang estimate that 
Korea’s welfare would increase by $4.8 billion (1.7 percent of GDP) 
and U.S. welfare would increase by $3.7 billion (0.7 percent).
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McDaniel and Fox (2001)
This comprehensive investigation of a U.S.-Korea FTA was mandated 
by the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance and was carried out by staff 
members of the United States International Trade Commission, Office 
of Economics and Office of Industries. The investigation contains an 
overview of the Korean economy, a description of bilateral trade and 
investment relations, an assessment of trading patterns and comparative 
advantages, detailed sectoral analyses, a review of each nation’s barri-
ers to trade, and analyses of the effects of eliminating existing bilateral 
barriers. The Korean barriers of greatest concern to the United States 
include domestic taxes, customs procedures, and nontariff barriers 
(NTBs); sectoral regulations involving agricultural and food products, 
pharmaceuticals and medical equipment, cosmetics, automobiles, pro-
fessional and financial services, broadcast advertising, and labeling; 
and intellectual property rights protection. The U.S. barriers of great-
est concern to Korea relate to trade remedy laws (antidumping and 
countervailing duties), labeling and maritime regulations, visas, and 
government procurement.
The effects of eliminating bilateral barriers are analyzed using a 
GTAP-type model, a partial equilibrium analysis applied to trade in 
selected agricultural products, and a qualitative assessment of remov-
ing certain NTBs and regulations. Our interest is in the CGE modeling. 
The USITC staff constructed a CGE model comprising 5 regions and 
10 sectors, using the GTAP version 4 database and a base year of 1995. 
To capture some of the dynamic aspects of the FTA, they assumed that 
the removal of barriers would commence in 2001. The model was then 
solved sequentially through 2009. As of 2005, it was estimated that 
U.S. economic welfare would increase by $19.6 billion (0.23 percent 
of GDP) and Korean economic welfare would increase by $3.9 billion 
(0.69 percent of GDP). Detailed results are provided for the changes in 
total and bilateral trade for the United States and Korea, changes in sec-
toral trade and output, changes in wages and prices, changes in selected 
agricultural products trade, and the qualitative changes of removing 
selected Korean NTBs and regulations.
Choi and Schott (2001, 2004)
These studies explore the issues and potential economic benefits and 
costs of an FTA between Korea and the United States. The authors review 
the historical background of Korea-U.S. international economic rela-
tions and efforts to develop a bilateral trade agreement. They examine 
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bilateral trade and investment flows and how frictions in the bilateral 
relationship might be resolved with an FTA. The chief U.S. complaints 
against Korea relate to import policies, including standards, testing, la-
beling, and certification; government procurement; intellectual property 
rights; services barriers; investment barriers; anticompetitive practices; 
and electronic commerce. The United States has singled out a number of 
sectoral problems of market access with Korea especially in agricultural 
products, automobiles, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, steel, and 
cosmetic products. Korea’s main complaints against the United States 
relate to U.S. antidumping and countervailing duties.
The authors use a gravity model approach to estimate the potential 
for greater mutual trade and also a CGE modeling approach to assess the 
welfare and related implications of a bilateral FTA.3 The CGE modeling 
was done by John Gilbert, based on a GTAP-type model consisting of 
10 regions and 10 sectors, using version 4 of the GTAP database and a 
base year of 1995. Two computational scenarios were run: a compara-
tive static scenario (medium run) in which product and factor markets 
clear; and a scenario (long run) in which the capital stock is permitted 
to adjust to reflect changes in the level and allocation of the capital 
stock through increased investment in response to changes in the real 
rate of interest caused by trade liberalization. The assumed liberaliza-
tion covers the removal of trade barriers affecting agricultural products 
and manufactures and manufactures only. Services liberalization is not 
included because of the lack of data.
The results are summarized in Table 1. It can be seen that Korea’s 
economic welfare would rise by $4.1 billion (0.91 percent of GDP) or 
$10.9 billion (2.41 percent of GDP) in the two scenarios. The results are 
considerably smaller when agricultural liberalization is excluded. U.S. 
economic welfare would rise by $3.8 billion (0.03 percent of GDP) or 
$8.9 billion (0.13 percent of GDP). There is evidence of trade diversion 
for all of the other countries or regions shown. The welfare effects are 
decomposed in Table 2. It can be seen that the comparative static (me-
dium run) results reflect sizable changes in the terms of trade, which, 
as mentioned above, are characteristic of GTAP models that rely on the 
Armington assumption of national product differentiation. The long-run 
3. A gravity model seeks to explain the determinants of bilateral trade at the 
aggregate level in terms of variables measuring gross national product, popu-
lation, and other forces that drive bilateral trade and variables such as trans-
port costs, trade barriers, and cultural and language differences that inhibit 
trade. Gravity models thus do not provide detailed estimates of the effects of 
trade liberalization at the sectoral level as is the case for CGE models.
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results reflect especially the growth effect caused by the inclusion of 
capital accumulation.4
Table 1: Estimated Welfare Effects of a Korea-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement, by Country or Region
Country or 
region
Full liberalization Excluding agriculture
Medium run Long run Medium run Long run
Australia and 
New Zealand
-296.3 -409.8 -17.6 10.6
(-0.07) (-0.10) (0.00) (0.00)
Japan -2,231.7 -3,581.9 -1,170.7 -1,941.2
(-0.04) (-0.07) (-0.02) (-0.04)
Korea 4,099.6 10,860.7 1,712.2 4,923.4
(0.91) (2.41) (0.38) (1.09)
China and 
Hong Kong
-486.5 -927.8 -427.3 -666.0
(-0.06) (-0.11) (-0.05) (-0.08)
ASEAN -519.8 -850.4 -278.7 -509.3
(-0.08) (-0.14) (-0.05) (-0.08)
Taiwan -267.3 -467.6 -83.9 -157.0
(-0.10) (-0.17) (-0.03) (-0.06)
United States 3,783.4 8,934.6 1,532.4 4,186.1
(0.05) (0.13) (0.02) (0.06)
Canada -293.4 -324.3 -193.3 -253.7
(-0.05) (-0.06) (-0.03) (-0.04)
Mexico -138.7 -379.7 -94.1 -306.1
(-0.05) (-0.14) (-0.03) (-0.11)
Rest of world -2,223.1 -3,813.9 -1,169.2 -1,689.7
(-0.02) (-0.03) (-0.01) (-0.01)
Sum of world 1,426.2 9,030.9 -190.3 3,597.3
(0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01)
Source: Choi and Schott (2001, 56).
ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Notes: Mean equivalent variation in millions of 1995 dollars. Percentage of GDP in 
parentheses.
4. To clarify the treatment of capital accumulation in the GTAP framework, a 
hypothetical “global bank” is introduced to incorporate international capital 
flows. Because of the limited availability of statistics on the bilateral FDI 
flows across countries, international capital flows are first pooled in the 
hypothetical global bank in the GTAP framework. The pooled capital is then 
redistributed from the global bank to each country, according to the rental 
rate. Because the global bank does not maximize anything, the international 
capital mobility in the GTAP framework is equivalent to introducing a hypo-
thetical international capital market. This in turn means that the GTAP model 
does not capture the bilateral FDI flows. In other words, the international cap-
ital mobility in the GTAP model simply means that the investment-savings 
balance is endogenously determined (through the hypothetical global bank). 
Therefore, for instance, even though the capital stock of Korea increases after 
the implementation of the Korea-U.S. FTA in the GTAP framework, this does 
not necessarily result in FDI flows from the United States to Korea. That is, 
there is a possibility that FDI may flow, for example, from China to Korea in 
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There are positive output effects for Korea (Choi and Schott 2001, 
116), especially in the medium run for processed food, textiles and 
apparel, chemicals, rubber, and plastics, and negative output effects in 
agriculture, forestry and fisheries, and durable manufactures. For the 
United States (Choi and Schott 2001, 117), the largest output increases 
are in agriculture, forestry and fisheries, and processed food, and nega-
tive output effects especially in textiles and apparel. Because services 
liberalization is not included, the results noted can be interpreted as a 
lower bound for the effects of liberalization. The authors also note that 
there may be other potential benefits of an FTA owing to increasing 
returns to scale, greater security of market access, removal of nontrade 
regulatory barriers, and the strengthening of international security rela-
tions. The authors conclude that there might be greater potential benefits 
from a broader degree of trade liberalization on the basis of the open 
regionalism of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum 
and from multilateral liberalization undertaken under World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) auspices.
the context of the Korea-U.S. FTA. Hence, although the GTAP model ostensi-
bly introduces international capital mobility, it does not say (or cannot say) 
anything about bilateral FDI flows.
Table 2: Decomposition of Welfare Effects of a Korea-U.S. Free 
Trade Agreement
Source
Full liberalization Excluding agriculture
Medium run Long run Medium run Long run
United States
Allocative 
efficiency
1.8 501.9 94.2 363.5
Terms of trade 3,781.4 2,772.6 1,438.2 866.6
Marginal 
utility of 
income
0.2 0.5 0.0 0.0
Growth effect 0.0 5,658.6 0.0 2,956.0
Total 3,783.4 8,934.6 1,532.4 4,186.1
Korea
Allocative 
efficiency
2,634.1 3,902.3 266.5 879.9
Terms of trade 1,509.5 -120.1 1,445.9 646.4
Marginal 
utility of 
income
-44.0 -85.8 -0.2 -1.4
Growth effect 0.0 7,164.3 0.0 3,398.5
Total 4,099.6 10,860.7 1,712.2 4,923.4
Source: Choi and Schott (2001, 57).
Note: Mean equivalent variation in millions of 1995 dollars.
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In Choi and Schott (2004), the potential for a Korea-U.S. FTA is 
reevaluated in a more favorable light in the context of the problems that 
have been encountered in moving ahead with the WTO Doha Devel-
opment Agenda negotiations. In the appendix by DeRosa and Gilbert 
(2004) in Schott (2004), Gilbert has undertaken computational analyses 
of the potential economic effects of 14 prospective bilateral FTAs, with 
a modeling framework consisting of 23 countries and 19 sectors. He 
used version 5 of the GTAP database and a base year of 1997. For the 
medium run, Korea’s economic welfare is estimated to increase by $1.6 
billion (0.37 percent of GDP) and U.S. welfare to increase by $2.7 bil-
lion (0.03 percent of GDP). These results are smaller than those noted 
above in Choi and Schott (2001), and there is a sizable terms-of-trade 
improvement for the United States.
A final point of interest is that Gilbert (DeRosa and Gilbert 2004, 
402) has carried out a scenario for multilateral free trade for agriculture 
and manufactures in which the United States is shown to experience a 
decline in economic welfare of $254 million (0.0 percent of GDP) com-
pared with an increase in Korea’s economic welfare of $9.6 billion (2.16 
percent of GDP). This is a rather surprising result, which may be due in 
large measure to changes in terms of trade, although no information is 
provided in the text about such changes. In contrast, in Chapter 4, we 
show that multilateral free trade, including agriculture, may increase U.S. 
economic welfare by $624.5 billion (3.5 percent of GDP) and Korea’s 
economic welfare by $94.2 billion (12.8 percent of GDP).
Lee and Lee (2005)
This is a comprehensive study from a Korean perspective of the issues 
and potential economic and noneconomic benefits that may be derived 
from a Korea-U.S. FTA. The authors analyze the U.S. trade negotiating 
strategy and process for FTA negotiations, the characteristics of U.S. 
FTAs, and Korea’s FTA strategy. They also discuss issues of bilateral 
Korea-U.S. economic relations and competitiveness and the international 
political economy of a Korea-U.S. FTA. Further, and of direct concern 
for our study, they use a version of the GTAP CGE model to calculate 
the welfare effects and a partial equilibrium model to determine the 
trade effects of a Korea-U.S. FTA.
The authors construct a GTAP CGE model that consists of 13 sec-
tors and 5 countries or regions plus the rest of world (ROW). They use 
the GTAP database, version 6, which refers to 2001. For purposes of 
analyzing a Korea-U.S. FTA, in a comparative static framework, they 
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assume 80 percent liberalization in agriculture, full liberalization in 
manufactured goods, and reduction in services barriers by 20 percent 
(scenario 1) and also a 50 percent reduction in services barriers (scenario 
2). They allow for capital accumulation in an effort to capture some 
dynamic effects.
The results for the percentage changes in GDP and consumption 
and the absolute changes in economic welfare are summarized in Table 
3. In the static model, there is a 0.42–0.59 percent increase in GDP and 
an increase of $2.4–2.7 billion in economic welfare. Taking capital ac-
cumulation into account, there is a 1.99–2.27 percent increase in GDP 
and an increase of $6.8–7.7 billion in economic welfare. The changes 
in sectoral production and employment in manufacturing caused by the 
FTA are noted in Table 4 and Table 5. The most notable increases in 
production are in garments and leather, textiles, automobiles and parts, 
and chemicals, and there are declines in other transport equipment, elec-
tronics, and machinery. The changes in sectoral employment mirror the 
changes in production. Total manufacturing employment is estimated to 
increase by 28,000–171,000 workers, which corresponds to 0.89–5.36 
percent of the total manufacturing labor force. It is unclear, however, 
what the basis is for the increase in employment noted because, con-
ceptually in the GTAP model being used, factor supplies are assumed 
to remain unchanged.
Services liberalization is modeled using the guesstimates of services 
barriers constructed by Hoekman (1995). Assuming the barriers are 
reduced by 50 percent, it is estimated that services output would rise by 
0.31 percent in the short run and by 3.3 percent in the long term. Total 
services employment is estimated to rise by 50,000–78,000 workers, 
which corresponds to 0.45-0.69 percent of the total services labor force. 
Again, the conceptual basis for the increase in services employment 
remains unclear, and it is also not clear how reliable the guesstimates 
of the services barriers may be.
Table 3: Effects on Korea of a Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement
Effects
Static model Dynamic model
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 1 Scenario 2
GDP (%) 0.42 0.59 1.99 2.27
Consumption 
expenditure (%)
0.57 0.65 1.64 1.85
Welfare 
(millions of 
dollars)
2,374 2,717 6,815 7,698
Source: Lee and Lee (2005, 86).
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The authors discuss at length the noneconomic issues that in their 
view reinforce the case for a Korea-U.S. FTA. These issues include 
questions of international security that are important for the two na-
tions in East Asia and the momentum and example that an FTA might 
provide for greater economic openness and integration in the region 
and multilaterally. A Korea-U.S. FTA is also argued to be important to 
stimulate Korea’s international competitiveness and its economic growth 
and to ensure that Korea is not left behind vis-à-vis other preferential 
arrangements that the United States may negotiate.
Schott, Bradford, and Moll (2006)
This policy brief builds upon the previous analyses of Choi and Schott 
(2001, 2004) noted above and addresses the issues involved in a Ko-
rea-U.S. FTA. The authors review the objectives of the United States 
and Korea in pursuing an FTA, document recent developments in their 
bilateral trade in goods and services and FDI, and review the bilateral 
disputes in the WTO. They then report the results of a CGE modeling 
analysis of the FTA. For this purpose, they have updated their earlier 
modeling effort with construction of a new GTAP model, with perfect 
competition and constant returns, and with 22 sectors, 4 regions (Korea, 
United States, Japan, and ROW), and 5 factors of production (unskilled 
labor, skilled labor, capital, land, and natural resources). The factor sup-
plies are assumed to remain fixed in the basic version of the model, and 
growth in the capital stock is permitted in a second version.
Two scenarios are run, the first assuming complete bilateral free 
trade in agricultural products and manufactures and complete free trade, 
excluding rice. Services liberalization is not included. The comparative 
Table 4: Changes in Sectoral Production in Korea
Industry
Effect of free trade agreement
Short term (%) Long term (%)
Total manufacturing -0.1 1.6
Processed food -0.9 -0.14
Sugar 2.2 2.9
Textiles 6.7 8.2
Garments and leather 13.1 13.9
Petrochemistry 0.3 1.7
Metals -1.3 0.56
Automobiles and parts 2.8 4.1
Other transport equipment -4.2 -2.2
Electronics -2.5 0.02
Machinery -2.2 0.09
Other manufacture -0.05 1.33
Source: Lee and Lee (2005, 89).
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static results for economic welfare are noted in Table 6. For the pure 
FTA, Korea’s welfare is shown to increase by $27.6 billion (3.5 percent 
of GDP) and by $20.2 billion (2.6 percent of GDP) with rice excluded. 
Making allowance for an increase in the capital stock, Korea’s welfare 
increases by $51.8 billion (6.6 percent of GDP) for the pure FTA and by 
$40.9 billion (5.2 percent of GDP) with rice excluded. For the United 
States, welfare is increased by $0.8 billion (0.01 percent of GDP) for 
the pure FTA and by $6.3 billion (0.05 percent of GDP) with rice ex-
cluded. With the increase in the capital stock, U.S. welfare is increased 
to $8.8 billion (0.07 percent of GDP) for the pure FTA and by $13.7 
billion (0.10 percent of GDP) with rice excluded. The smaller welfare 
effects for the United States for the pure FTA that includes liberalizing 
trade in rice are attributed to the modeling assumption made about U.S. 
subsidies to its rice producers. Japan’s welfare is shown to increase 
Table 5: Changes in Sectoral Employment in Korea, Before and 
After a Free Trade Agreement
Industry
Before FTA
After FTA
Short-run effects Long-run effects
Number of 
employed
Number of 
employed
Number of 
increase 
(growth 
rates, %)
Number of 
employed
Number of 
increase 
(growth 
rates, %)
Total 
manufacturing
3,915,100 3,223,561 28,461 3,366,460 171,360
(0.89) (5.36)
Processed 
food
281,718 262,256 -19,462 278,819 -2,899
(-6.9) (-1.03)
Sugar 1,473 1,548 75 1,570 97
(5.1) (6.59)
Textiles 236,687 268,529 31,842 275,669 38,982
(13.5) (16.5)
Garments and 
leather
274,082 337,880 63,798 341,733 67,651
(23.3) (24.7)
Petro-
chemistry
341,928 344,880 2,952 358,951 17,023
(0.86) (5.0)
Metals 337,087 326,140 -10,947 341,731 4,644
(-3.3) (1.4)
Automobiles 
and parts
212,473 238,101 25,628 249,652 37,179
(12.1) (17.5)
Other 
transport 
equipment
98,465 88,947 -9,396 93,341 -5,002
(-9.6) (-5.1)
Electronics 559,465 523,099 -36,366 559,551 290
(-6.5) (0.05)
Machinery 372,780 353,592 -19,188 373,551 771
(-5.2) (0.21)
Other 
manufacture
479,064 478,589 -475 491,688 12,624
(-0.1) (2.6)
Source: Lee and Lee (2005, 90).
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only marginally, and there are welfare reductions for ROW, presumably 
caused by trade diversion.
The percentage returns to labor and capital are seen to increase 
considerably for Korea in Table 7, while the returns to land and natural 
resources fall. For the United States, there are negligible effects on 
the returns to capital and labor and increases in the returns to land and 
natural resources. Changes in sectoral output are noted in Table 8. For 
the pure FTA, in Korea, there are reductions in output in rice, other 
primary products, durable manufactures, and business services. For 
the United States, with the pure FTA, there is a very large percentage 
increase in rice output and declines in most other sectors, as resources 
are apparently shifted to producing additional rice. With rice excluded, 
the output effects for Korea do not change very much while there are 
small percentage reductions in output in most U.S. sectors. The numbers 
of Korean jobs gained or lost by sector are recorded in Table 9. It ap-
pears that, with the pure FTA, Korea’s rice employment is shown to be 
decimated, with the decline in employment indicated to be larger than 
the initial employment. By the same token, several of the employment 
changes in other sectors also appear to be very substantial.5 Taken at 
Table 6: Overall Welfare Results (Change in Equivalent 
Variation)
Country
Medium run:
Capital stock fixed
Long run:
Capital grows
Rice 
excluded
Pure free 
trade 
agreement
Rice 
excluded
Pure free 
trade 
agreement
Korea Billions of 
dollars
20.220 27.582 40.887 51.799
Percentage of 
GDP
2.58 3.51 5.21 6.60
United States Billions of 
dollars
6.325 0.766 13.693 8.835
Percentage of 
GDP
0.05 0.01 0.10 0.07
Japan Billions of 
dollars
0.478 1.676 0.702 1.962
Percentage of 
GDP
0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04
Rest of world Billions of 
dollars
-5.512 -4.153 -9.390 -7.483
Percentage of 
GDP
-0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03
Source: Schott, Bradford, and Moll (2006, 26).
5. There is apparently a rounding error in Table 9, which shows net changes 
in overall employment. Such net changes are ruled out because the labor 
market is supposed to clear in the model.
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face value, the calculations suggest that Korea would experience major 
disruptions in its labor market with a pure FTA.
Following their computational analysis results, the authors seek to 
identify the key issues in the FTA negotiations. For the United States, 
the key issues include Korea’s policies regarding market access for au-
tomobiles and beef, pharmaceutical pricing, and insurance regulations 
for reimbursements. Key issues for Korea include the U.S. resolution of 
steel antidumping problems, access to the U.S. visa waiver program, and 
duty-free coverage of labor-intensive products produced in the Kaesong 
industrial complex that involves participation with North Korea. A final 
concern that is raised is whether a Korea-U.S. FTA would spur further 
efforts to forge other bilateral and regional trading arrangements in East 
and Southeast Asia, especially and more broadly in APEC, and also 
provide an impetus multilaterally to revive the WTO Doha Development 
Agenda negotiations.
Conclusions
In this chapter, we have reviewed a number of studies of the economic 
issues and potential effects of a Korea-U.S. FTA. The economic issues 
have been addressed using a standard GTAP model that assumes perfect 
competition, constant returns to scale, and products distinguished by 
place of production. This latter (Armington) assumption gives coun-
tries some degree of monopoly power in their trade, with the effect that 
Table 7: Change in Real Factor Prices
Factor of 
production
Medium run: Capital stock fixed Long run: Capital grows
Rice excluded 
(%)
Pure free 
trade 
agreement 
(%)
Rice excluded 
(%)
Pure free 
trade 
agreement 
(%)
Korea
Unskilled labor 11.4 11.4 16.8 16.2
Skilled labor 12.8 13.1 17.0 17.9
Capital 11.9 12.4 7.0 6.7
Land -11.4 -45.3 -5.1 -40.9
Natural 
resources
-74.0 -57.8 -73.6 -57.1
United States
Unskilled labor 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
Skilled labor -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0
Capital 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Land 5.8 12.7 6.3 13.6
Natural 
resources
8.7 8.6 9.2 9.3
Source: Schott, Bradford, and Moll (2006, 26).
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trade liberalization may result in substantial terms-of-trade effects that 
may not be altogether plausible. The studies use different versions of 
the GTAP database, with varying coverage of the numbers of countries 
or regions and sectors. While the standard GTAP model assumes that 
endowments of labor and capital are fixed, it was noted that one of the 
GTAP studies provides estimates of overall changes in employment. This 
is not altogether plausible in the comparative static framework. Finally, 
several GTAP studies make allowance for increases in capital stocks in 
order to capture presumably some of the long-run, dynamic changes that 
may occur. However, the mechanism for introducing increased capital 
stocks does not identify the sources and destinations of the capital flows 
that are generated within the GTAP framework.
The modeling results for changes in economic welfare from the 
GTAP studies reviewed are summarized in Table 10. The positive 
Table 8: Change in Output
Category
Share of output
Medium term Long term
Rice 
excluded
Pure free 
trade 
agreement
Rice 
excluded
Pure free 
trade 
agreement
Korea 
(%)
United 
States 
(%)
Korea 
(%)
United 
States 
(%)
Korea 
(%)
United 
States 
(%)
Korea 
(%)
United 
States 
(%)
Korea 
(%)
United 
States 
(%)
Paddy rice 0.0078 0.0001 -0.7 -3.1 -98.5 641.8 1.9 -3.0 -98.7 673.3
Wheat 0.0013 0.0004 21.7 -6.1 57.1 -12.0 24.4 -5.9 62.9 -14.1
Vegetables and fruits 0.0091 0.0015 10.3 -0.9 34.5 -2.8 13.5 -0.9 39.5 -2.8
Other primary 
products
0.0149 0.0168 -75.4 6.5 -52.1 5.5 -76.0 6.9 -52.7 5.9
Beef 0.0020 0.0048 110.4 -0.6 110.1 -0.8 120.9 -0.6 121.9 -0.8
Other meat 0.0044 0.0039 95.3 -0.7 95.6 -1.0 105.2 -0.7 106.5 -1.0
Dairy 0.0032 0.0047 23.9 -0.1 22.7 -0.2 32.5 0.0 32.3 -0.1
Processed rice 0.0067 0.0001 8.2 0.0 363.1 -21.1 12.0 0.1 386.0 -20.9
Other food products 0.0283 0.0280 19.3 0.3 24.6 0.1 26.0 0.4 32.5 0.3
Textiles 0.0236 0.0081 12.4 -1.4 13.8 -1.4 16.7 -1.3 18.9 -1.4
Wearing apparel 0.0082 0.0061 27.6 -0.8 28.9 -1.0 30.1 -0.7 31.8 -0.8
Leather products 0.0042 0.0009 62.1 -1.3 64.6 -1.5 61.5 -1.2 64.2 -1.4
Chemicals, rubber, 
and plastic products
0.0669 0.0399 -0.4 -0.4 0.5 -0.4 4.5 -0.4 6.1 -0.4
Iron, steel, and 
nonferrous metals
0.0426 0.0141 8.9 -0.9 9.9 -1.0 15.3 -0.9 17.4 -1.1
Motor vehicles 0.0444 0.0260 -3.2 -0.3 -2.6 -0.4 -0.8 -0.4 0.0 -0.4
Other transport 0.0128 0.0108 -15.5 -0.5 -14.1 -0.7 -13.4 -0.6 -11.5 -0.7
Electronic 
equipment
0.0715 0.0196 -15.7 -0.5 -15.2 -0.7 -10.4 -0.7 -9.5 -0.9
Other machinery and 
equipment
0.0773 0.0439 -13.6 -0.5 -12.8 -0.5 -8.7 -0.5 -7.2 -0.6
Other manufactured 
goods
0.0800 0.0694 34.3 -0.7 35.6 -0.7 39.3 -0.7 41.4 -0.7
Trade and transport 
services
0.1142 0.1741 0.6 0.0 1.9 0.0 5.9 0.0 8.0 0.0
Business services 0.1282 0.2133 -2.4 0.0 -2.4 0.0 2.4 0.0 3.1 0.0
Other services 0.2485 0.3137 0.7 0.0 0.7 0.0 4.3 0.1 4.8 0.1
Source: Schott, Bradford, and Moll (2006, 27).
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welfare gains for Korea range from 0.4 percent to 3.5 percent of GDP 
in the different studies assuming complete bilateral tariff removal. The 
results are larger if allowance is made for increases in the capital stock, 
with increases varying from 1.99 percent to 6.6 percent of GDP in the 
different studies. What stands out in Table 10 is that the results obtained 
by Schott, Bradford, and Moll (2006) are several times larger than all 
of the other studies noted. It is difficult to understand what the sources 
of the differences may be because all of the studies have used the same 
GTAP modeling framework and a common database.
In all studies, the welfare effects of a Korea-U.S. FTA on the United 
States are very small, ranging from 0.01 percent of GDP to 0.23 percent 
of GDP for complete bilateral tariff removal and from 0.07 percent to 
0.13 percent of GDP with allowance for an increase in the capital stock. 
Except for Lee and Lee (2005), none of the other studies cited include 
Table 9: Number of Korean Jobs Gained or Lost in the Medium-
Term Scenario
Category Initial employment Rice excluded
Pure free trade 
agreement
Paddy rice 215,880 -27,633 -213,721
Wheat 21,000 1,491 1,323
Vegetables and fruits 219,960 -6,819 -20,016
Other primary 
products
177,360 -144,548 -116,703
Beef 4,080 4,500 4,561
Other meat 15,240 14,463 14,783
Dairy 22,800 5,404 5,381
Processed rice 2,160 173 7,938
Other food products 141,840 26,950 36,027
Textiles 236,160 28,812 34,243
Wearing apparel 103,680 28,719 30,586
Leather products 56,280 34,837 36,695
Chemical, rubber, and 
plastic products
407,640 -2,446 4,892
Iron, steel, and 
nonferrous metals
216,960 18,442 22,998
Motor vehicles 344,400 -11,021 -6,544
Other transport 152,280 -23,756 -20,710
Electronic equipment 319,800 -51,488 -46,691
Other machinery and 
equipment
666,720 -91,341 -80,673
Other manufactured 
goods
639,000 217,899 233,235
Trade and transport 
services
2,024,040 10,120 50,601
Business services 2,145,120 -53,628 -34,322`
Other services 3,867,360 23,204 54,143
Total net change 2,335 -1,975
Source: Schott, Bradford, and Moll (2006, 29).
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liberalization of services barriers, allowance for the effects of imperfect 
competition, and a clear determination of the employment shifts that a 
Korea-U.S. FTA may engender. It is in this light that we now turn to our 
analysis using the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade that 
makes allowance for a number of important relationships that are not 
included in the studies based on the GTAP framework. It is hoped this 
model will expand the understanding of the economic forces at play in 
evaluating the effects of a Korea-U.S. FTA.
Table 10: Comparison of GTAP Modeling Results for Economic 
Welfare in the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (billions of 
dollars and percentage of GDP)
Research
Comparative static results 
No FDI
Comparative static results 
Including FDI
Cheong and Wang (1999)
Korea $4.8 billion
(1.7 % of GDP)
United States $3.7 billion
(0.7% of GDP
McDaniel and Fox (2001)
Korea $3.9 billion
(0.69% of GDP)
United States $19.6 billion
(0.23% of GDP)
Choi and Schott (2001)
Korea $4.1 billion
(0.91% of GDP)
$10.9 billion
(2.41% of GDP)
United States $3.8 billion
(0.03% of GDP)
$8.9 billion
(0.13% of GDP)
Choi and Schott (2004)
Korea $1.6 billion
(0.37% of GDP)
United States $2.7 billion
(0.03% of GDP)
Lee and Lee (2005)
Korea $2.4 billion
(0.42% of GDP)
$6.8 billion
(1.99% of GDP)
Schott, Bradford, and Moll (2006)
Korea $27.6 billion
(3.5% of GDP)
$51.8 billion
(6.6% of GDP)
United States $0.8 billion
(0.01% of GDP)
$8.8 billion
(0.07% of GDP)
Source: Authors’ data.
FDI = foreign direct investment
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Comparative Static and Dynamic 
Analysis of a Korea-U.S. FTA
We first discuss the main features of the Michigan Model of World 
Production and Trade that has been used for computational purposes. 
We then discuss the benchmark data used in the model and thereafter 
present the results of our comparative static and dynamic computational 
scenarios.
Overview of the Michigan Model 
of World Production and Trade
The version of the Michigan Model that we use in this study covers 27 
economic sectors, including agriculture, manufactures, and services, 
in each of 30 countries or regions. The distinguishing feature of the 
Michigan Model is that it incorporates some aspects of trade with im-
perfect competition, including increasing returns to scale, monopolistic 
competition, and product variety. Some details follow.6 A more complete 
description of the formal structure and equations of the model can be 
found online.7
6. See also Deardorff and Stern (1990, 9–46) and Brown and Stern (1989a, 
1989b). Some readers may wish to skip the technical discussion and move 
directly to the section on interpreting the model results.
7. See the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade, Univer-
sity of Michigan, School of Public Policy, Department of Economics, 
www.Fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/model/.
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Sectors and Market Structure
As mentioned, the version of the model to be used in this study consists 
of 27 production sectors and 30 countries or regions (plus ROW). The 
sectoral and country or region coverage are indicated in the tables below. 
Agriculture is modeled as perfectly competitive with product differentia-
tion by country of origin, and all other sectors covering manufactures 
and services are modeled as monopolistically competitive. Each mo-
nopolistically competitive firm produces a differentiated product and 
sets price as a profit-maximizing markup of price over marginal cost. 
Free entry and exit of firms then guarantees zero profits.
Expenditure
Consumers and producers are assumed to use a two-stage procedure to 
allocate expenditure across differentiated products. In the first stage, 
expenditure is allocated across goods without regard to the country 
of origin or producing firm. At this stage, the utility function is Cobb-
Douglas, and the production function requires intermediate inputs in 
fixed proportions. In the second stage, expenditure on monopolistically 
competitive goods is allocated across the competing varieties supplied 
by each firm from all countries. In the perfectly competitive agricultural 
sector, because individual-firm supply is indeterminate, expenditure is 
allocated over each country’s sector as a whole, with imperfect substitu-
tion between products of different countries.
The aggregation function in the second stage is a constant elasticity 
of substitution (CES) function. Use of the CES function and product 
differentiation by firm imply that consumer welfare is influenced by any 
reduction in real prices brought about by trade liberalization as well as by 
increased product variety. The elasticity of substitution among different 
varieties of a good is assumed to be 3, a value that is broadly consistent 
with available empirical estimates. The parameter for the sensitivity of 
consumers to the number of product varieties is set at 0.5.8
8. If the variety parameter is greater than 0.5, it means that consumers value 
variety more. If the parameter is zero, consumers have no preference for 
variety. This is the same as the Armington assumption, according to which 
consumers view products as distinguished by country of production. Sensitiv-
ity tests of alternative parameter values are included in the Appendix.
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Production
The production function is separated into two stages. In the first stage, 
intermediate inputs and a primary composite of capital and labor are used 
in fixed proportion to output.9 In the second stage, capital and labor are 
combined through a CES function to form the primary composite. In the 
monopolistically competitive sectors, additional fixed inputs of capital 
and labor are required. It is assumed that fixed capital and fixed labor 
are used in the same proportion as variable capital and variable labor so 
that production functions are homothetic. The elasticities of substitution 
between capital and labor vary across sectors and were derived from a 
literature search of empirical estimates of sectoral supply elasticities. 
Economies of scale are determined endogenously in the model.
Supply Prices
To determine equilibrium prices, perfectly competitive firms operate 
such that price is equal to marginal cost, while monopolistically com-
petitive firms maximize profits by setting price as an optimal markup 
over marginal cost. The numbers of firms in sectors under monopolistic 
competition are determined by the zero profits condition. The free entry 
condition in this context is also the basic mechanism through which new 
product varieties are created (or eliminated). Each of the new entrants 
arrives with a distinctly different product, expanding the array of goods 
available to consumers.
Free entry and exit are also the means through which countries are 
able to realize the specialization gains from trade. In this connection, 
it can be noted that in a model with nationally differentiated products, 
which relies on the Armington assumption, production of a particular 
variety of a good cannot move from one country to another. In such a 
model, there are gains from exchange but no gains from specialization. 
However, in the Michigan Model, with differentiated products supplied 
by monopolistically competitive firms, production of a particular variety 
is internationally mobile. A decline in the number of firms in one country 
paired with an expansion in another essentially implies that production 
of one variety of a good is being relocated from the country in which the 
number of firms is declining to the country in which the number of firms 
9. Intermediate inputs include both domestic and imported varieties.
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is expanding. Thus, we have both an exchange gain and a specialization 
gain from international trade.10
Capital and Labor Markets
Capital and labor are assumed to be perfectly mobile across sectors 
within each country. Returns to capital and labor are determined so as 
to equate factor demand to an exogenous supply of each factor. The 
aggregate supplies of capital and labor in each country are assumed to 
remain fixed so as to abstract from macroeconomic considerations (for 
example, the determination of investment), because our microeconomic 
focus is on the intersectoral allocation of resources.
World Market and Trade Balance
The world market determines equilibrium prices such that all markets 
clear. Total demand for each firm’s or sector’s product must equal total 
supply of that product. It is also assumed that trade remains balanced 
for each country or region, that is, any initial trade imbalance remains 
constant as trade barriers are changed. This is accomplished by permit-
ting aggregate expenditure to adjust to maintain a constant trade balance. 
Thus, we abstract away from the macroeconomic forces and policies 
that are the main determinants of trade imbalances. Further, it should be 
noted that there are no nominal rigidities in the model. As a consequence, 
there is no role for a real exchange rate mechanism.
Trade Policies and Rent or Revenues
We have incorporated into the model the import tariff rates and export 
taxes or subsidies as policy inputs that are applicable to the bilateral 
trade of the various countries or regions with respect to each other. These 
have been computed using the GTAP-6.0 2001 Database provided in 
Dimaranan and McDougall (2005). The export barriers have been es-
timated as export-tax equivalents. We assume that revenues from both 
10. The international relocation of a particular variety of a good can be 
understood in the context of the ongoing outsourcing debate. Domestic firms 
require intermediate inputs in addition to capital and labor. To the extent 
that tariff reduction leads a firm to substitute toward traded intermediate 
inputs, domestic firms can be thought of as outsourcing some component of 
production. This is particularly the case if there is a decline in the number of 
domestic firms in the sector from which intermediate inputs are purchased 
and an expansion in the supplier country.
24  Economic Effects of a Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement Comparative Static and Dynamic Analysis of a Korea-U.S. FTA  25
import tariffs and export taxes, as well as rents from NTBs on exports, 
are redistributed to consumers in the tariff- or tax-levying country and 
are spent like any other income.
Tariff liberalization can affect economic efficiency through three 
main channels. First, in the context of standard trade theory, tariff re-
ductions reduce the cost of imports for consumers and for producers 
purchasing traded intermediate inputs, thus producing an exchange gain. 
Second, tariff removal leads firms to direct resources toward those sectors 
that have the greatest value on the world market. That is, we have the 
standard specialization gain. Third, tariff reductions have a pro-competi-
tive effect on sellers. Increased price pressure from imported varieties 
forces incumbent firms to cut price. Surviving firms remain viable by 
expanding output, thereby moving down their average total cost (ATC) 
curve. The consequent lower ATC of production creates gains from the 
realization of economies of scale.
Model Closure and Implementation
We assume in the model that aggregate expenditure varies endogenously 
to hold aggregate employment constant. This closure is analogous to the 
Johansen closure rule (Deardorff and Stern 1990, 27–29). The Johansen 
closure rule consists of keeping the requirement of full employment 
while dropping the consumption function. This means that consumption 
can be thought of as adjusting endogenously to ensure full employment. 
However, in the present model, we do not distinguish consumption from 
other sources of final demand. That is, we assume instead that total 
expenditure adjusts to maintain full employment.
The model is solved using GEMPACK (Harrison and Pearson 
1996). When policy changes are introduced into the model, the method 
of solution yields percentage changes in sectoral employment and cer-
tain other variables of interest. Multiplying the percentage changes by 
the absolute levels of the pertinent variables in the database yields the 
absolute changes, positive or negative, that might result from the various 
liberalization scenarios.
Interpreting the Modeling Results
To help the reader interpret the modeling results, it is useful to review the 
features of the model that serve to identify the various economic effects 
to be reflected in the different applications of the model. Although the 
model includes the aforementioned features of imperfect competition, 
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it remains the case that markets respond to trade liberalization in much 
the same way that they would with perfect competition. That is, when 
tariffs or other trade barriers are reduced in a sector, domestic buyers 
(both final and intermediate) substitute toward imports, and the domestic 
competing industry contracts production while foreign exporters expand. 
Thus, in the case of multilateral liberalization that reduces tariffs and 
other trade barriers simultaneously in most sectors and countries, each 
country’s industries share in both of these effects, expanding or contract-
ing depending primarily on whether their protection is reduced more or 
less than in other sectors and countries.
Worldwide, these changes cause increased international demand 
for all sectors. World prices increase most for those sectors where trade 
barriers fall the most.11 This in turn causes changes in countries’ terms 
of trade that can be positive or negative. Those countries that are net 
exporters of goods with the greatest degree of liberalization will experi-
ence increases in their terms of trade, as the world prices of their exports 
rise relative to their imports. The reverse occurs for net exporters in 
industries where liberalization is slight, perhaps because it may already 
have taken place in previous trade rounds.
The effects on the welfare of countries arise from a mixture of 
these terms-of-trade effects, together with the standard efficiency gains 
from trade and also from additional benefits owing to the realization 
of economies of scale. Thus, we expect on average that the world will 
gain from multilateral liberalization, as resources are reallocated to 
those sectors in each country where there is a comparative advantage. 
In the absence of terms-of-trade effects, these efficiency gains should 
raise national welfare measured by the equivalent variation for every 
country,12 although some factor owners within a country may lose, as 
will be noted below. However, it is possible for a particular country 
whose net imports are concentrated in sectors with the greatest liber-
alization to lose overall, if the worsening of its terms of trade swamps 
these efficiency gains.
11. The price of agricultural products supplied by the rest of the world is 
taken as the numeraire in the model, and there is a ROW against which all 
other prices can rise.
12. The equivalent variation is a measure of the amount of income that 
would have to be given or taken away from an economy before a change 
in policy in order to leave the economy as well off as it would be after the 
policy change has taken place. If the equivalent variation is positive, it is 
indicative of an improvement in economic welfare resulting from the policy 
change.
26  Economic Effects of a Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement Comparative Static and Dynamic Analysis of a Korea-U.S. FTA  27
In contrast, although trade with imperfect competition is perhaps 
best known for introducing reasons why countries may lose from trade, 
actually its greatest contribution is to expand the list of reasons for gains 
from trade. Thus, in the Michigan Model, trade liberalization permits all 
countries to expand their export sectors at the same time that all sectors 
compete more closely with a larger number of competing varieties from 
abroad. As a result, countries as a whole gain from lower costs owing to 
increasing returns to scale, lower monopoly distortions owing to greater 
competition, and reduced costs or increased utility (or both) owing to 
greater product variety. All of these effects make it more likely that 
countries will gain from liberalization in ways that are shared across 
the entire population.13
The various effects just described in the context of multilateral 
trade liberalization will also take place when there is unilateral trade 
liberalization, although these effects will depend on the magnitudes of 
the liberalization in relation to the patterns of trade and the price and 
output responses involved between the liberalizing country and its trad-
ing partners. Similarly, many of the effects described will take place with 
the formation of bilateral or regional FTAs. But in these cases, there 
may be trade creation and positive effects on the economic welfare of 
FTA member countries together with trade diversion and negative effects 
on the economic welfare of nonmember countries. The net effects on 
economic welfare for individual countries and globally will thus depend 
on the economic circumstances and policy changes implemented.14
13. In perfectly competitive trade models such as the Heckscher-Ohlin 
Model, one expects countries as a whole to gain from trade, but the owners of 
one factor—the “scarce factor”—are expected to lose through the mecha-
nism first explored by Stolper and Samuelson (1941). The additional sources 
of gain from trade caused by increasing returns to scale, competition, and 
product variety, however, are shared across factors, and we routinely find in 
our CGE modeling that both labor and capital gain from multilateral trade 
liberalization.
14. It may be noted that, in a model of perfect competition, bilateral trade 
liberalization should have the effect of contracting trade with the excluded 
countries, thereby improving the terms of trade for the FTA members vis-
à-vis the ROW. But in a model with scale economies, the pro-competitive 
effect of trade liberalization can generate a cut in price and increase in supply 
to excluded countries. The terms of trade of FTA members may therefore 
deteriorate in this event. It should also be mentioned that rules of origin may 
offset some of the potential welfare benefits of FTAs insofar as they may lead 
to higher input costs and consequent reduction of FTA preference margins 
(Krishna 2006).
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In the real world, all of the various effects occur over time, some 
of them more quickly than others. However, the Michigan Model is 
static in the sense that it is based upon a single set of equilibrium condi-
tions rather than relationships that vary over time.15 The model results 
therefore refer to a time horizon that depends on the assumptions made 
about which variables do and do not adjust to changing market condi-
tions, and on the short- or long-run nature of these adjustments. Because 
the supply and demand elasticities used in the model reflect relatively 
long-run adjustments and it is assumed that markets for both labor and 
capital clear within countries,16 the modeling results are appropriate for 
a relatively long time horizon of several years—perhaps two or three at 
a minimum. On the other hand, the model does not allow for the very 
long-run adjustments that could occur through capital accumulation, 
population growth, and technological change. The modeling results 
should therefore be interpreted as being superimposed upon longer-run 
growth paths of the economies involved. To the extent that these growth 
paths themselves may be influenced by trade liberalization, therefore, 
the model does not capture such effects.
Benchmark Data
Needless to say, the data needs of this model are immense. Apart from 
numerous share parameters, the model requires various types of elastic-
ity measures. As for other CGE models, most of our data come from 
published sources.
15. As noted above, macroeconomic closure in the model involves the equiv-
alent of having expenditure equal to the sum of earned incomes plus redistrib-
uted net tax revenues. However, the actual solution is attained indirectly, but 
equivalently, by imposing a zero change in the trade balance. Because the 
model allows for all net tax and tariff revenues to be redistributed to consum-
ers, when tariffs are reduced with trade liberalization, the model implicitly 
imposes a nondistorting tax to recoup the loss in tariff revenues.
16. The analysis in the model assumes throughout that the aggregate, econo-
my-wide level of employment is held constant in each country. The effects of 
trade liberalization are therefore not permitted to change any country’s over-
all rates of employment or unemployment. This assumption is made because 
overall employment is determined by macroeconomic forces and policies 
that are not contained in the model and would not themselves be included 
in a negotiated trade agreement. The focus instead is on the composition of 
employment across sectors as determined by the microeconomic interactions 
of supply and demand resulting from the liberalization of trade.
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The main data source used in the model is the GTAP-6.0 Database 
of the Purdue University Center for Global Trade Analysis Project 
(Dimaranan and McDougall 2005). The reference year for this GTAP 
database is 2001. From this source, we have extracted the following 
data, aggregated to our sectors and countries or regions:
•      Bilateral trade flows among 30 countries or regions, decomposed 
into 27 sectors. Trade with ROW is included to close the model;
•      Input-output tables for the 30 countries or regions, excluding 
ROW;
•      Components of final demand along with sectoral contributions 
for the 30 countries or regions, excluding ROW;
•      Gross value of output and value added at the sectoral level for the 
30 countries or regions, excluding ROW;
•      Bilateral import tariffs by sector among the 30 countries or 
regions;
•      Elasticity of substitution between capital and labor by sector; and
•      Bilateral export-tax equivalents among the 30 countries or re-
gions, decomposed into 27 sectors.
The monopolistically competitive market structure in the nonag-
ricultural sectors of the model imposes an additional data requirement 
of employment and the numbers of firms at the sectoral level. These 
data have been adapted from a variety of published sources, as will be 
noted below.
The GTAP-6.0 2001 database has been projected to the year 2020, 
which is when we assume that the Doha Round currently under way 
will have been completed and fully implemented. In this connection, we 
extrapolated the labor availability in different countries or regions by an 
annual average weighted population growth rate that varies by country or 
region.17 All other major variables have been projected, using an aver-
age weighted growth rate of GDP of 3.1 percent. In the computational 
scenarios to be presented below, we use these extrapolated data as the 
17 The growth projection of labor force from 2001 to 2020 is obtained from 
U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base Summary Demographic Data 
for Taiwan and United Nations; and World Population Prospects (the 2004 re-
vision, medium variant, http://esa.un.org/unpp) for other countries or regions. 
For a more elaborate and detailed procedure for calculating data extrapola-
tions, see van der Mensbrugghe (2005) and related documents.
30  Economic Effects of a Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement Comparative Static and Dynamic Analysis of a Korea-U.S. FTA  31
starting point to carry out our liberalization scenarios for the bilateral 
Korea-U.S. FTA and for the accompanying unilateral and global free 
trade scenarios.
In the GTAP-6.0 2001 database, the barriers on agricultural products 
consist of import tariffs, export subsidies or taxes, and domestic support. 
Tariffs on food and agriculture come from the WTO Agricultural Trade 
Policy Database, which is based on the Agricultural Market Access 
Database. Domestic support data are based on the producer support 
estimates for Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) countries and input-output tables for non-OECD countries if 
data are available. Tariffs on merchandise come from the World Inte-
grated Trade Solutions system of the World Bank and United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). To incorporate the 
implementation of the Doha Round, the GTAP-6.0 2001 database has 
been adjusted using the tariff-cutting scenario provided by GTAP.18 The 
implementation of the Doha Round means that developed countries cut 
agricultural protection by the percentages specified in the Doha Develop-
ment Agenda, and all countries are assumed to adopt 50 percent tariff 
cuts for nonagricultural goods and manufactures.
The services barriers are based on financial data on average gross 
(price-cost) margins constructed initially by Hoekman (2000) and 
adapted for modeling purposes in Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (2002, 
2003). The gross operating margins are calculated as the differences 
between total revenues and total operating costs and are presumed to 
reflect the barriers on the various modes of services transactions. Some 
of these differences are presumably attributable to fixed costs. Given 
that the gross operating margins vary across countries, a portion of the 
margin can be attributed in particular to barriers to FDI. For this purpose, 
a benchmark is set for each sector in relation to the country with the 
smallest gross operating margin, on the assumption that operations in 
the benchmark country can be considered to be freely open to foreign 
firms. The excess in any other country above this lowest benchmark is 
then taken to be due to barriers to establishment by foreign firms.
That is, the barrier is modeled as the cost increase attributable to 
an increase in fixed cost borne by multinational corporations attempt-
ing to establish an enterprise locally in a host country. This abstracts 
from the possibility that fixed costs may differ among firms because of 
18. For more detail, see “GTAP 6 Data Base with Doha Scenarios Data,” 
Purdue University, GTAP, https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/databases/v6/
V6_dohascen.asp.
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variations in market size, distance from headquarters, and other factors. 
It is further assumed that this cost increase can be interpreted as an ad 
valorem equivalent tariff on services transactions generally. The services 
barriers based on Hoekman (2000) are considerably higher than the 
import barriers on manufactures and reflect the fact that many services 
sectors are highly regulated and therefore may restrain international 
services transactions considerably. Nonetheless, as noted, because of 
the variations that exist in fixed costs, it is possible that the Hoekman 
services barriers may be overstated. We have accordingly reduced these 
barriers by 50 percent for modeling purposes. These services barriers for 
the United States and Korea are shown in Table 11 and Table 12.
Employment data, defined as labor force (LFi), were obtained from 
Ministry of Home Affairs (2003) for India, Council for Economic Plan-
ning and Development (2006) for Taiwan, and World Bank (2006) for 
other countries or regions. Because employment data are not available 
at the sectoral level, we estimated the sectoral employment share, using 
the latest available data from UNIDO (2006) for manufacturing and from 
ILO (2006) for nonmanufacturing sectors. Multiplying the share by the 
total labor force (that is, LFi × sij), we estimated the sectoral employment 
data. Employment in the agricultural sector was further decomposed into 
10 detailed agricultural sectors, using the labor endowment data in the 
GTAP-6.0 2001 database (that is, the employment was decomposed by 
the labor endowment shares).
Data on the number of firms were obtained from UNIDO (2006). If 
the number of firms was not available, we used the data for the number 
of establishments. Because the latest available years are different among 
countries and regions, we adjusted the number of firms, using the per 
capita GDP growth rate. For instance, if the latest available year was 
2000, we multiplied the per capita GDP growth rate from 2000 to 2001 
by the number of firms. For Taiwan, Brazil, and Uruguay, the number 
of firms was not available. We thus first estimated the total number of 
firms in the manufacturing sectors and then decomposed this total to the 
sectoral level, using the sectoral employment shares. For Taiwan, the 
total number of firms was estimated from the number of firms in Japan 
multiplied by the relative per capita GDP between Japan and Taiwan. 
Similarly, for Brazil and Uruguay, the total number of firms was esti-
mated from the number of firms in Argentina multiplied by the relative 
per capita GDP between Argentina and Brazil (or Uruguay).
The value and shares of U.S. exports and imports of goods and ser-
vices for 2001 in total and vis-à-vis Korea are broken down by sector in 
Table 11. U.S. total exports were $888.8 billion in 2001 and exports to 
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Korea were $29.4 billion, or 3.3 percent of total exports. Some ad-
ditional detail on U.S. exports by major trading country for 2003 and 
2004 is given in Table 13. Korea ranks seventh in the group of countries 
shown. The sectoral shares of U.S. exports to Korea that are indicated 
in Table 11 show that 73.9 percent of these exports are concentrated in 
manufactures, especially transportation equipment and machinery and 
equipment, nearly 20 percent in services, and approximately 6 percent 
in agricultural products. U.S. total imports were $1,300.9 billion in 
2001, and imports from Korea totaled $38.7 billion, or 3.0 percent of 
total imports. As noted in Table 13, Korea ranked seventh in the group 
of importing countries shown. The sectoral shares of U.S. imports from 
Korea are predominantly in manufactures (91.1 percent), especially in 
transportation equipment and machinery and equipment, and 8.7 percent 
in services.
As noted in Table 12, Korea’s exports totaled $177.2 billion and 
total imports were $162.6 billion in 2001. The United States accounted 
for 21.2 percent of total Korean exports and 18.6 percent of total Ko-
rean imports. The sectoral shares of Korea’s exports of manufactures to 
the United States were 90.8 percent of the total and were concentrated 
especially in transportation equipment and machinery and equipment, 
and 9.1 percent in services. The sectoral shares of Korea’s imports of 
Table 13: U.S. Exports and Imports by Major Trading Countries, 
2003 and 2004 (millions of dollars and percentage)
Country
2003 exports 2004 exports 2003 imports 2004 imports
Amount
Share 
and rank Amount
Share 
and rank Amount
Share 
and rank Amount
Share 
and rank
Canada 169,923.7 23.4 189,879.9 23.5 221,594.7 17.6 256,359.8 17.4
(1) (1) (1) (1)
Mexico 97,411.8 13.4 110,935 13.7 138,060 11.0 155,901.5 10.6
(2) (2) (3) (3)
China 28,367.9 3.9 34,744.1 4.3 152,436.1 12.1 196,682 13.4
(6) (5) (2) (2)
Japan 52,004.3 7.2 54,243.1 6.7 118,036.6 9.4 129,805.2 8.8
(3) (3) (4) (4)
Germany 28,831.9 4.0 31,415.9 3.9 68,112.7 5.4 77,265.6 5.2
(5) (6) (5) (5)
England 33,827.9 4.7 36,000 4.5 42,795 3.4 46,273.8 3.1
(4) (4) (6) (6)
Korea 24,072.6 3.3 26,412.5 3.3 37,229.4 3.0 46,167.9 3.1
(7) (7) (7) (7)
Taiwan 1,747.9 2.4 21,744.4 2.7 31,599.4 2.5 34,623.6 2.4
(9) (9) (8) (8)
France 17,053 2.4 21,263.3 2.6 29,219.3 2.3 31,605.7 2.1
(10) (10) (9) (9)
Source: U.S. Census Bureau as reported in Lee and Lee (2005, 51).
Note: Number in parentheses indicates rank.
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manufactures from the United States were 74.1 percent of the total, 6.4 
percent for agricultural products, and 18.7 percent for services. The 
value of Korea’s bilateral trade with the United States for 1980–2005 
is shown in Table 14. It is evident that the U.S. shares of this trade have 
declined considerably in the period shown, from 26.3 percent of Korean 
exports to the United States in 1980 to 14.5 percent in 2005. Similarly, 
the U.S. share of Korean imports declined from 21.9 percent in 1980 to 
12 percent in 2005. These changes can be seen more clearly in Table 15 
with changes in Korea’s exports and imports by major trading partners 
between 2000 and 2005. What stands out is the increased importance of 
Korea’s trade with China, which accounted for 10.7 percent of Korean 
exports in 2000 and 21.8 percent in 2005. Similarly, Korean imports 
from China were 8.0 percent of total imports in 2000 and 18.5 percent 
in 2005.
Employment by sector is indicated in the last two columns of Tables 
11 and 12. The U.S. total labor force in 2001 was 148.9 million workers, 
with more than 80 percent of employment in the services sectors, 2.2 
percent in agriculture, and 14.3 percent in manufacturing. The Korean 
labor force was 23.0 million in 2001, with 9.4 percent of employment 
in agriculture (3.6 percent in both rice and vegetables and fruits), 19.8 
percent in manufactures, and 70.2 percent in services.
Information on the stock of inward and outward U.S. FDI abroad for 
2005 is indicated in Table 16. Inward FDI for the United States totaled 
$1,635.3 billion and outward FDI totaled $2,070 billion. Inward FDI 
from Korea was $6.2 billion, or 0.4 percent of the total; 9.3 percent of 
the total from Korea was in manufacturing and the remainder in ser-
vices-related sectors. U.S. outward FDI to Korea was $18.8 billion, or 
9.0 percent of the U.S. total. U.S. FDI in Korean manufacturing was 
Table 14: Value of Korea’s Bilateral Trade with the United States: 
1980–2005
Year
Korean exports to the 
United States
Korean imports from the 
United States Trade 
balanceValue Share Value Share
1980 4,606.6 26.3 4,890.2 21.9 -283.6
1985 10,754.1 35.5 6,489.3 20.8 4,264.8
1990 19,360.0 29.8 16,942.5 24.3 2,417.5
1995 24,131.5 19.3 30,403.5 22.5 -6,272.0
2000 37,610.6 21.8 29,421.6 18.2 8,189.0
2002 32,780.2 20.2 23,008.6 15.1 9,771.6
2003 34,219.4 17.7 24,814.1 13.9 9,405.3
2004 42,849.0 16.9 28,783.0 12.8 14,066.0
2004(1–9) 30,129.0 14.5 22,779.0 12.0 7,350.0
Sources: Korea International Trade Association as reported in Lee and Lee (2005, 52).
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$8.3 billion, 44 percent of total U.S. FDI in Korea, and the remainder in 
services-related sectors. World FDI flows into Korea by major countries 
from 1962–90 to 2005 are indicated in Table 17. Most of these inflows 
came from the United States, the European Union, and Japan. Korean 
outward FDI flows in manufacturing industry are shown in Table 18 for 
2001 to 2005. China has become the major recipient of Korean outward 
manufacturing FDI.
With the foregoing by way of background, we turn now to our 
computational analysis, which will focus on the economic effects on 
the United States and Korea of the bilateral removal of trade barriers on 
agricultural products, manufactures, and services as the result of a Korea-
U.S. FTA. Depending on the details of the FTA negotiations, many of 
these bilateral barriers would be removed immediately, but some would 
be phased out over longer periods of time. For modeling purposes, how-
ever, we assume that all barriers are removed at the same time rather than 
in phases. As noted in Chapter 1, many other aspects of the Korea-U.S. 
Table 15: Korea: Major Trading Partners (billions of dollars, 
percentage share of world total in parentheses)
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Korean exports to
United States 37.6 31.2 32.8 34.2 42.9 41.3
(21.8) (20.7) (20.2) (17.6) (16.9) (14.5)
Japan 20.5 16.5 15.1 17.3 21.7 24.0
(11.9) (11.0) (9.3) (8.9) (8.6) (8.4)
China, excluding 
Hong Kong
18.5 18.2 23.8 35.1 49.8 61.9
(10.7) (12.1) (14.6) (18.1) (19.6) (21.8)
European Union 23.4 19.6 21.7 24.9 37.8 43.7
(13.6) (13.0) (13.4) (12.8) (14.9) (15.4)
Subtotal 100.0 85.5 93.4 111.5 152.2 170.9
(58.0) (56.8) (57.5) (57.5) (60.0) (60.1)
World total 172.3 150.4 162.5 193.8 253.8 284.4
Korean imports from
United States 29.2 22.4 23.0 24.8 28.8 30.6
(18.2) (15.9) (15.1) (13.9) (12.8) (11.7)
Japan 31.8 26.6 29.9 36.3 46.1 48.4
(19.8) (18.9) (19.7) (20.3) (20.5) (18.5)
China, excluding 
Hong Kong
12.8 13.3 17.4 21.9 29.6 38.7
(8.0) (9.4) (11.4) (12.2) (13.2) (14.8)
European Union 15.8 14.9 17.1 19.4 24.2 27.3
(9.8) (10.6) (11.2) (10.9) (10.8) (10.5)
Subtotal 89.6 77.2 87.4 102.4 128.7 145.0
(55.8) (54.7) (57.5) (57.3) (57.3) (55.5)
World total 160.5 141.1 152.1 178.8 224.5 261.2
Source: Korea Ministry of Finance and Economy, Major Economic Indicators, 17 
February 2006, as reported in Schott, Bradford, and Moll (2006, 19).
Note: Exports are free on board (fob) basis and imports are cost, insurance, freight (cif) 
basis.
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FTA are to be negotiated besides the bilateral barriers. Because these 
other aspects involve primarily qualitative considerations on rules and 
procedures, they are not taken into account in what follows.
Comparative Static Computational Scenarios
The global welfare effects of the bilateral removal of agricultural protec-
tion, manufactures tariffs, and services barriers are indicated in Table 19. 
The sectoral effects on exports, imports, gross output, and employment 
are indicated in Table 20 and Table 21.19
Bilateral Agricultural Liberalization
The first four columns of Table 19 refer to the bilateral elimination of 
agricultural tariffs and export subsidies. No allowance has been made 
for removal of domestic agricultural supports because these supports 
do not apply bilaterally. It is evident that U.S. welfare declines by $1.4 
Table 16: Inward and Outward Foreign Direct Investment for the 
United States, 2005 (millions of U.S. dollars)
Areas of foreign direct investment
Inward FDI Outward FDI
All 
countries Korea
All 
countries Korea
Mining 114,386 1
Manufacturing 538,122 577 451,402 8,251
Food 19,779 4 31,524 795
Chemicals 151,624 32 109,354 1,515
Primary and fabricated metals 28,651 139 21,671 102
Machinery 48,673 -7 29,224 495
Computers and electronic products 47,016 n.a. 58,785 2,328
Electrical equipment, appliances, and 
components
14,191 n.a. 13,079 286
Transportation equipment 76,036 n.a. 48,930 696
Other manufacturing 152,152 89 138,836 2,034
Wholesale trade 230,104 4,539 142,960 1,144
Retail trade 29,686 n.a.
Information 142,556 n.a. 55,479 251
Depository institutions (banking) 130,940 328 70,331 3,712
Finance (except depository institutions) and 
insurance
207,552 144 393,723 1,949
Real estate and rental and leasing 41,006 59
Professional, scientific, and technical services 41,879 2 49,202 856
Holding companies (nonbank) 623,076 312
Other industries 273,444 14 169,424 2,284
All industries 1,635,291 6,203 2,069,983 18,759
Sources: BEA (2006, 59 [Table 10.4]) for inward FDI for the United States; BEA (2006, 106 [Table 10.3]) 
for outward FDI for the United States.
19. See the appendix for sensitivity analysis of introducing alternative pa-
rameters in the model and the resulting impacts of trade liberalization.
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billion (0.01 percent of GDP) with bilateral removal of agricultural 
tariffs,20 and there is a small welfare increase of $.05 billion for the 
bilateral removal of agricultural export subsidies. Korea experiences 
a welfare increase of $.05 billion for tariff removal. Global economic 
welfare rises by $2.73 billion, with most countries benefiting from the 
bilateral tariff removal and showing insignificant welfare losses from 
the bilateral removal of the export subsidies.
Bilateral Manufactures Liberalization
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 19 refer to the welfare effects of the bi-
lateral elimination of manufactures tariffs. U.S. welfare is increased by 
$7.27 billion (0.04 percent of GDP), and Korea’s welfare is increased by 
Table 17: World Foreign Direct Investment Flows into Korea by 
Major Countries (millions of dollars, percentage)
Period Total
United States
European 
Union Japan Others
Values
Share 
(%) Values
Share 
(%) Values
Share 
(%) Values
Share 
(%)
1962–
90
7,874 2,243 29 984 13 3,798 48 848 11
1991 1,396 297 21 749 54 226 16 124 9
1995 1,947 643 33 461 24 424 22 419 22
2000 15,217 2,922 19 4,391 29 2,448 16 5,455 36
2001 11,292 3,889 34 3,062 27 772 7 3,569 32
2002 9,101 4,500 49 1,663 18 1,403 15 1,535 17
2003 6,467 1,240 19 3,061 47 541 8 1,625 25
2004 12,785 4,717 37 3,008 24 2,258 18 2,802 15
2005 
(Jan.–
Sept.)
7,697 1,350 17.4 3,778 49.1 972 12.6 1,597 20.7
Source: Korean Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy, each year, as reported in Lee 
and Lee (2005, 56).
Table 18: Korean Outward FDI (Manufacturing Industry) to 
Major Countries: 2001–2005 (Sept.) (millions of dollars)
Major 
countries 2001 2002 2003 2004
2005 
(Sept.)
China 589.8 905.7 1,464.1 2,059.3 1,504.0
U.S. 975.7 165.2 360.6 492.9 154.5
EU 1,735.9 281.3 66.1 405.8 271.6
Japan 25.0 9.1 8.5 32.1 33.8
Source: Korea Export and Import Bank, as reported in Lee and Lee (2005, 58).
20. The welfare decline with removal of bilateral agricultural tariffs may 
reflect the shift of labor and capital toward constant-returns-to-scale agricul-
tural sectors and away from the increasing-returns-to-scale manufactures and 
services sectors.
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$4.48 billion (0.61 percent of GDP). There are small welfare increases 
and declines for the other countries or regions. Global welfare rises by 
$12.43 billion.
Bilateral Services Liberalization
The effects of bilateral services liberalization noted in columns (7) and 
(8) are considerably larger compared with the agricultural and manu-
factures liberalization. U.S. welfare increases by $19.20 billion (0.11 
percent of GDP), and Korea’s welfare increases by $5.46 billion (0.74 
percent of GDP). All other countries or regions show small and positive 
increases in welfare.
Combined Bilateral Liberalization
The effects of the combined bilateral liberalization of agricultural protec-
tion, manufactures, and services are shown in columns (9) and (10). U.S. 
welfare increases by $25.12 billion (0.14 percent of GDP), and Korea’s 
welfare increases by $9.28 billion (1.26 percent of GDP). Most of the 
other countries or regions show small, positive increases in welfare. 
Global economic welfare rises by $41.04 billion. These results are in 
contrast with the magnitudes and signs of the welfare effects generated 
using the GTAP framework as noted in Tables 1 and 6.
Real Returns to Capital and Labor
The real returns to capital and labor are shown in columns (11) and (12). 
These returns increase by 0.03 and 0.02, respectively, for the United 
States and considerably more for Korea—1.36 percent and 1.53 percent. 
There are small increases in the real returns in the other countries or 
regions. These results differ significantly from those noted in Table 6 
above, based on Schott, Bradford, and Moll (2006, 26), which show 
increases in real factor prices for labor and capital greater than 10 percent 
for Korea and very small changes for the United States. The results in 
McDaniel and Fox (2001, 5–15) are somewhat more in line with our 
results in Table 19.
Terms of Trade
The last column in Table 19 shows small terms-of-trade improve-
ment for both the United States and Korea. These changes in terms 
of trade are much smaller than the terms-of-trade results generated by 
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the GTAP framework, as, for example, in Table 2 based on Choi and 
Schott (2001).
Sectoral Effects: United States
The changes in U.S. exports and imports arising from the FTA are in-
dicated in the first four columns of Table 20. Total exports and imports 
increase by $7.8 billion. Agricultural exports increase by $1.6 billion; 
food, beverages, and tobacco by $1 billion; manufactures by $2.6 billion; 
and services by $2.5 billion. There are negligible imports of agricultural 
Table 20: Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: Change in Exports, 
Imports, Outputs, and Number of Workers for the United States
Industry
Exports Imports Output
Employment
Number of 
workers a
Value Percent Value Percent Value Percent Value Percent
Rice 30 4.8 0 0.3 33 1.1 460 1.1
Wheat 25 0.4 1 0.2 28 0.2 388 0.2
Other grains 618 5.8 2 0.2 649 1.6 7,446 1.6
Vegetables and fruits 99 1.1 13 0.1 83 0.2 1,064 0.2
Oil seeds 494 4.6 1 0.3 527 1.7 7,151 1.7
Sugar 0 0.1 0 0.2 4 0.1 67 0.1
Plant-based fibers 26 0.6 (0) -0.1 6 0.0 63 0.0
Other crops 185 3.3 16 0.2 193 0.3 3,390 0.3
Livestock 78 1.1 8 0.1 197 0.1 1,092 0.1
Other natural 
resources
10 0.4 2 0.1 8 0.0 (2) -0.0
Mining 5 0.1 131 0.1 (72) -0.0 (363) -0.0
Food, beverages, and 
tobacco
1,046 2.0 101 0.2 1,226 0.1 1,880 0.1
Textiles (19) -0.1 784 1.5 (1,109) -0.4 (4,426) -0.5
Wearing apparel (10) -0.1 1,209 1.4 (954) -0.5 (3,482) -0.6
Leather products and 
footwear
14 0.4 70 0.2 (32) -0.1 (171) -0.2
Wood and wood 
products
32 0.1 148 0.1 (54) -0.0 (483) -0.0
Chemicals 784 0.4 434 0.2 490 0.0 119 0.0
Nonmetallic mineral 
products
149 0.6 43 0.1 104 0.0 289 0.0
Metal products 157 0.3 288 0.3 (87) -0.0 (1,077) -0.0
Transportation 
equipment
51 0.0 1,009 0.3 (704) -0.1 (2,287) -0.1
Machinery and 
equipment
1,341 0.3 716 0.1 792 0.0 1,438 0.0
Other manufactures 125 0.5 177 0.2 (8) -0.0 (186) -0.0
Construction (2) -0.1 3 0.1 2 0.0 (68) -0.0
Electricity, gas, and 
water
(5) -0.1 2 0.2 20 0.0 (639) -0.0
Trade and transport 646 0.6 1,043 0.7 (72) -0.0 (5,379) -0.0
Other private services 1,534 0.8 1,064 0.9 612 0.0 (569) -0.0
Government services 322 0.4 470 1.3 (344) -0.0 (5,714) -0.0
Total 7,735 7,735 1,537 0
Source: Authors’ data. 
a. Changes in employment sum to zero because of assumption of full employment.
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products, imports of manufactures increase by $4.9 billion, and imports 
of services increase by $2.6 billion. These changes in U.S. trade differ 
from the changes noted in McDaniel and Fox (2001, 5–10), Choi and 
Schott (2001, 58), and Lee and Lee (2005, 88).
Changes in the value of output are indicated in the fifth and sixth 
columns. It is evident that output expands in all of the agricultural sec-
tors; food, beverages, and tobacco; chemicals; nonmetallic mineral 
products; machinery and equipment; other manufactures; and other 
private services. Output declines especially in textiles and wearing ap-
parel. These results are smaller than those reported in McDaniel and 
Fox (2001, 5–13) and especially those reported in Table 8 above that is 
based on Schott, Bradford, and Moll (2006).
Changes in employment shown in the seventh and eighth columns 
mirror the changes in output. It appears that employment is shifted to the 
expansion of the agricultural sectors and food, beverages, and tobacco, 
and away from most of the manufacturing sectors and from services. But 
the employment changes noted are all comparatively small in percentage 
terms. It should also be noted that the employment changes sum to zero 
because of the assumption of full employment of the fixed labor supply. 
That is, there will be positive and negative shifts in employment that 
balance out for the economy as a whole.
Sectoral Effects: Korea
The changes in Korea’s exports and imports arising from the FTA are 
indicated in Table 21. Korea has minor changes in its agricultural exports. 
Its exports of manufactures increase by $6.4 billion and services by $2.3 
billion. Korea’s imports of agricultural products and food, beverages, 
and tobacco increase by $1.7 billion, manufactures by $3.8 billion, and 
services by $2.8 billion.
Korea’s declines in output are concentrated in four of the agricul-
tural sectors and to a small extent in nonmetallic mineral products and 
machinery and equipment. Within agriculture, there are negative output 
and employment changes in other grains, vegetables and fruits, oil seeds, 
and other crops, while output and employment increase in rice, wheat, 
and livestock. The underlying results, which stem from the structure of 
the model,21 indicate that Korean agricultural import prices fall rela-
tive to domestic goods for all sectors. But the change in the quantity 
21. For the complete description of the formal structure and equations 
of the model, see the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade, 
www.Fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/model/.
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demanded is greater than the relative price decline in the rice, wheat, 
and livestock sectors, so that output and employment increase in these 
sectors. There are noticeably large increases in output and employment in 
textiles, wearing apparel, leather products and footwear, and transporta-
tion equipment and declines in the other manufacturing sectors and in 
services. The employment changes thus reflect the shift of labor from 
the more capital-intensive to the relatively labor-intensive manufactur-
ing sectors, and the changes are large enough to suggest that adjustment 
problems may be encountered depending on how rapidly the bilateral 
Table 21: Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: Change in Exports, 
Imports, Outputs, and Number of Workers for Korea
Industry
Exports Imports Output
Employment
Number of 
workers a
Value Percent Value Percent Value Percent Value Percent
Rice 0 6.6 36 27.7 380 2.7 23,659 2.7
Wheat (0) -0.4 39 4.0 17 0.7 512 0.7
Other grains 0 2.2 161 8.3 (90) -34.7 (4,294) -34.7
Vegetables and fruits (5) -1.0 112 22.1 (39) -0.2 (2,317) -0.3
Oil seeds (0) -0.3 327 34.8 (129) -58.2 (8,655) -58.2
Sugar 0 0.1 0 2.4 0 1.9 0 1.8
Plant-based fibers (0) -1.8 74 8.9 3 4.2 190 4.1
Other crops (5) -1.1 176 13.6 (120) -3.1 (6,939) -3.1
Livestock 4 3.9 65 3.4 459 3.5 6,656 3.5
Other natural 
resources
1 0.6 18 1.3 79 1.4 289 0.2
Mining (1) -1.8 386 1.0 (41) -1.3 (317) -1.6
Food, beverages, and 
tobacco
277 6.9 663 7.6 2,255 3.1 (2,373) -0.7
Textiles 2,123 8.6 242 3.6 3,942 9.5 29,591 7.6
Wearing apparel 1,746 27.7 (182) -6.0 2,181 15.5 33,033 13.2
Leather products and 
footwear
327 7.7 12 0.6 592 8.0 5,168 5.8
Wood and wood 
products
10 0.2 111 2.0 250 0.7 (1,694) -0.4
Chemicals 407 1.0 1,034 3.5 1,515 0.9 (1,374) -0.2
Nonmetallic mineral 
products
4 0.2 170 3.4 (43) -0.2 (2,215) -1.4
Metal products 94 0.4 357 1.7 283 0.3 (3,556) -0.7
Transportation 
equipment
1,244 2.7 243 2.1 1,904 2.0 4,116 0.7
Machinery and 
equipment
(213) -0.2 1,575 1.8 (841) -0.3 (20,385) -1.4
Other manufactures 261 5.3 112 4.2 287 2.8 1,077 1.4
Construction 0 0.1 2 1.1 580 1.2 63 0.1
Electricity, gas, and 
water
(0) -0.1 1 1.4 250 0.3 (4,476) -0.3
Trade and transport 1,018 7.9 591 2.7 2,783 1.4 (23,553) -0.3
Other private services 904 6.1 1,837 7.8 1,831 0.6 (9,512) -0.4
Government services 396 9.7 432 15.8 158 0.1 (12,692) -0.3
Total 8,594 8,594 18,449 (0)
Source: Authors’ data. 
a. Changes in employment sum to zero because of assumption of full employment.
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barriers would be removed. These employment results are in contrast 
with those reported in Table 5 above based on Lee and Lee (2005) and 
Table 9 based on Schott, Bradford, and Moll (2006).
Changes in Bilateral Trade Flows
Table 22 provides an indication of the changes in the bilateral trade flows 
in all the countries or regions of the model in response to the Korea-U.S. 
FTA. U.S. bilateral exports to Korea increase by $9.2 billion but decline 
across all other countries or regions as trade diversion takes place. U.S. 
imports from Korea increase by $6.9 billion, and there are increased U.S. 
imports from several other trading partners as well as small reductions 
in imports from a number of other countries. Korea’s bilateral exports 
increase to most of its trading partners. Its bilateral imports from the 
United States increase, but its imports decline from most of its trading 
partners, again indicating the presence of trade diversion.
From
To
JPN USA EUN CAN AUS NZL HKG KOR SGP TWN CHN IND IDN MYS PHL THA
JPN 0 104 (16) 8 (0) (0) (12) 25 1 (4) (77) (2) (3) 1 1 (1)
USA (136) 0 (530) (138) (22) (6) (27) 9,173 (32) (41) (79) (14) (10) (16) (9) (14)
EUN (58) 264 0 17 (6) (3) (28) (117) (8) (12) (76) (18) (7) (6) (3) (9)
CAN (7) 54 (29) 0 (1) (0) (2) (5) (1) (2) (11) (1) (1) (1) (0) (1)
AUS (6) 9 (5) 1 0 (3) (1) 10 (0) (3) (7) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1)
NZL (0) 4 (1) 0 0 0 (0) (10) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
HKG (1) 6 (2) 1 0 (0) 0 (19) 0 (2) (30) (1) (0) (0) (1) (1)
KOR 205 6,930 289 57 11 5 60 0 (11) (12) 468 12 66 (12) 15 15
SGP (5) 12 (9) 1 (0) (0) (7) (5) 0 (1) (11) (2) (2) (3) (1) (1)
TWN (0) 27 3 2 (0) (0) (10) (1) 2 0 (48) (1) (7) 1 (6) (2)
CHN 36 218 141 19 6 0 (9) (428) 18 14 0 4 2 8 1 7
IND (1) (8) (7) (0) (0) (0) (1) (11) (0) (1) (3) 0 (1) (1) (0) (1)
IDN (3) 8 6 1 (0) (0) (1) 35 (1) (2) (5) (1) 0 (1) (1) (1)
MYS (7) 16 (5) 1 (0) (0) (4) (3) (5) (1) (11) (4) (1) 0 (0) (1)
PHL (4) 8 (1) 1 0 (0) (1) (7) (1) (0) (2) (0) (0) (0) 0 (0)
THA 0 6 3 1 1 (0) (1) (21) 3 1 (3) (0) (1) 1 (0) 0
VNM 12 3 43 1 (0) 0 0 (14) (0) 2 (1) (0) (0) 0 0 0
RUS (2) 10 (12) 0 0 (0) (0) (7) (0) (0) (10) (1) (0) (0) (0) (0)
TUR (0) (2) (10) 0 0 (0) (0) (3) (0) (0) (1) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
MEX (2) (8) (9) 1 (0) (0) (1) (3) (0) (1) (2) (2) (0) (0) (0) (0)
ARG 1 9 8 1 0 0 (0) (90) 0 (0) 0 0 0 (0) 0 0
BRA 3 41 20 2 0 0 (0) (156) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CHL (2) 6 (1) 0 (0) (0) (0) 6 (0) (0) (2) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
COL (0) 1 (0) 0 (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
PER (0) 12 (2) (0) (0) (0) (0) 0 (0) (0) (0) (4) (0) (0) (0) (0)
URY (0) 0 0 0 0 (0) (0) (1) 0 (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
ROA 1 (25) 6 1 0 (0) (1) 3 (1) (0) (2) 0 (0) (0) (0) 1
XME (20) 14 (39) (0) (1) (0) (3) 248 (3) (8) (14) (6) (2) (2) (1) (4)
CLA (1) (16) (4) 2 0 (0) (0) (12) (0) (0) (1) (0) (0) 0 0 (0)
AFR (3) 34 (33) 1 (0) (0) (1) (7) (0) (3) (6) (4) (1) (0) (0) (1)
ROW (2) (0) (43) (0) (1) (0) (0) 15 (0) (1) (6) (1) (0) (0) (0) (1)
Imp. (3) 7,735 (241) (21) (14) (9) (52) 8,594 (41) (73) 60 (47) 29 (33) (7) (16)
Table 22. Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: Changes in Bilateral 
Trade Flows (millions of dollars)
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Dynamic Scenarios
As noted, the Michigan Model essentially provides comparative static 
estimates of the economic effects of the bilateral removal of Korea-
U.S. tariffs and other trade barriers. The question arises as to whether 
the bilateral liberalization may induce additional effects arising from 
changes in rates of return to capital that may motivate movements of 
FDI and improvements in factor productivity. These changes depend 
on a variety of empirical circumstances that are difficult to model in a 
general way. But, as we already noted, it has been common in GTAP-
type modeling studies to make some allowance for increases in capital 
stocks that may be engendered by trade liberalization. Such efforts of 
necessity are matters of judgment and should therefore be interpreted 
Table 22. Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: Changes in Bilateral 
Trade Flows (millions of dollars) (continued)
To
VNM RUS TUR MEX ARG BRA CHL COL PER URY ROA XME CLA AFR ROW Exp.
(2) (0) (1) 4 (2) (3) (0) (0) (0) (0) (7) 5 (17) (3) (1) (3)
(1) (14) (10) (95) (20) (41) (5) (3) (8) (1) (12) (28) (83) (42) 0 7,735
9 (25) (19) 7 (20) (28) (2) (1) (0) (1) (16) 29 (23) (50) (31) (241)
0 (1) (0) (1) (1) (2) (0) (0) (0) (0) (1) (0) (4) (2) (0) (21)
0 (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (2) 1 (0) (1) (1) (14)
0 (0) (0) 0 (0) (0) 0 (0) (0) (0) (0) 0 (0) (0) (0) (9)
1 (0) (0) 0 (1) (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) (2) 2 (0) (0) (0) (52)
43 25 17 21 4 14 6 4 6 2 81 105 111 70 (12) 8,594
1 (0) (0) 0 (0) (1) (0) (0) (0) (0) (7) 2 (1) (1) (0) (41)
(10) (0) (0) 2 (1) (1) (0) (0) (0) (0) (13) (3) (4) (2) (0) (73)
4 (2) 1 10 0 2 1 0 1 0 (8) 11 (0) 6 (3) 60
0 (1) (0) 0 (0) (1) (0) (0) 0 (0) (5) (1) (1) (1) (0) (47)
(1) (0) (0) 0 (0) (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) (2) (0) (0) 0 (0) 29
(1) (0) (0) 1 (1) (0) (0) (0) 0 (0) (5) 1 (0) (1) (0) (33)
0 (0) (0) 0 (0) (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) (0) 0 0 0 (0) (7)
0 (0) (0) 1 (0) (0) 0 0 0 (0) (4) 0 (0) (1) (0) (16)
0 (0) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 (0) 0 (0) 47
0 0 (1) 0 (0) (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) (1) 2 (1) (0) (13) (39)
0 (1) 0 0 (0) (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) (0) (1) (0) (1) (2) (22)
0 (0) (0) 0 (1) (1) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 0 (7) (1) (0) (39)
0 0 0 1 0 4 4 0 0 0 (0) 3 2 2 (0) (54)
0 0 0 6 (3) 0 2 0 2 0 (0) 4 3 2 (1) (72)
0 (0) 0 0 (1) (1) 0 (0) (0) (0) (0) 0 (1) (0) (0) 3
0 (0) (0) 0 (0) (0) (0) 0 0 (0) (0) 0 (1) (0) (0) (1)
0 (0) (0) (0) (0) (1) (0) (0) 0 (0) (0) 0 (4) (0) (0) (0)
(0) (0) (0) 0 (1) (0) 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 (0) (0) (0) (2)
(0) 0 (0) 1 (0) (0) (0) 0 0 (0) 0 (1) (0) (0) (0) (19)
0 (1) (2) (0) (1) (3) (0) (0) (0) (0) (11) 0 (1) (5) (1) 133
0 (1) (0) 2 (2) (2) (0) (0) 0 (0) (0) 1 0 (0) (0) (37)
0 (1) (1) 0 (1) (4) (0) (0) 0 (0) (1) 2 (1) 0 (1) (32)
0 (15) (4) (0) (0) (1) (0) (0) (0) (0) (1) (1) (1) (2) 0 (69)
47 (39) (22) (39) (54) (72) 3 (1) (0) (2) (19) 133 (37) (32) (69)
Source: Authors’ data.
JPN = Japan, USA = United States, EUN = EU and EFTA, CAN = Canada, AUS = Australia, NZL = New 
Zealand, HKG = Hong Kong, KOR = Korea, SGP = Singapore, TWN = Taiwan, CHN = China, IND = India, 
IDN = Indonesia, MYS = Malaysia, PHL = Philippines, THA = Thailand, VNM = Vietnam, RUS = Russia, 
TUR = Turkey, MEX = Mexico, ARG = Argentina, BRA = Brazil, CHL = Chile, COL = Colombia, PER = Peru, 
URY - Uruguay, ROA = Rest of Asia, XME = Rest of Middle East, CLA = Rest of Central and Latin America, 
AFR = Africa, ROW = Rest of World, Imp. = Imports, Exp. = Exports
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with care. It is in this light that we have adapted the Michigan Model 
to make allowance for changes in FDI that are assumed to be induced 
by a Korea-U.S. FTA.
For this purpose, we ran two scenarios in which FDI in Korea was 
assumed to increase by 1 percent and by 5 percent of Korea’s base 
capital stock. We further assumed that the FDI flows to Korea came 
from Japan, the United States, the European Union and the European 
Free Trade Association, and China based on the proportions of the FDI 
flows that these countries or regions represented in 2004. In modeling 
Table 23: Global Welfare Effects of Korea-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement, including Foreign Direct Investment
Countries and 
areas of the 
world
No FDI FDI (1%) FDI (5%)
Welfare effects
FDI 
flows Welfare effects
FDI 
flows Welfare effects
%
Billions 
of 
dollars
Billions 
of 
dollars %
Billions 
of 
dollars
Billions 
of 
dollars %
Billions 
of 
dollars
FDI home Japan 0.01 1.0 -69.5 -0.01 -0.4 -347.7 -0.08 -6.1
FDI home United States 0.14 25.1 -144.9 0.13 22.9 -724.6 0.08 13.8
FDI home EU and EFTA 0.01 1.2 -92.5 -0.01 -0.8 -462.5 -0.06 -8.8
Canada 0.02 0.3 0.03 0.3 0.04 0.5
Australia 0.02 0.1 0.04 0.2 0.12 0.7
New Zealand 0.02 0.0 0.03 0.0 0.09 0.1
Hong Kong 0.04 0.1 0.05 0.1 0.10 0.3
FDI host Korea 1.26 9.3 342.6 2.62 19.3 1713.0 8.05 59.4
Singapore 0.02 0.0 0.05 0.1 0.18 0.2
Taiwan -0.01 0.0 0.01 0.1 0.07 0.4
FDI home China 0.11 2.2 -35.6 0.07 1.4 -178.2 -0.08 -1.6
India 0.03 0.1 0.06 0.2 0.17 0.4
Indonesia 0.00 0.0 0.01 0.1 0.03 0.3
Malaysia -0.01 0.0 0.05 0.1 0.27 0.4
Philippines 0.02 0.0 0.05 0.1 0.17 0.2
Thailand 0.01 0.0 0.02 0.0 0.08 0.2
Vietnam 0.10 0.1 0.11 0.1 0.19 0.1
Russia 0.01 0.0 0.01 0.0 0.01 0.1
Turkey 0.01 0.0 0.01 0.0 0.03 0.1
Mexico 0.02 0.2 0.02 0.2 0.02 0.3
Argentina -0.01 0.0 -0.01 0.0 0.02 0.1
Brazil 0.06 0.5 0.06 0.6 0.08 0.7
Chile 0.03 0.0 0.05 0.1 0.13 0.1
Colombia 0.02 0.0 0.03 0.0 0.06 0.1
Peru 0.01 0.0 0.02 0.0 0.03 0.1
Uruguay 0.01 0.0 0.01 0.0 0.04 0.0
Rest of Asia 0.01 0.1 0.02 0.1 0.05 0.2
Rest of Middle 
East
0.03 0.4 0.08 0.9 0.26 3.0
Rest of Central 
and Latin America
0.02 0.1 0.03 0.2 0.07 0.4
Africa 0.02 0.2 0.03 0.3 0.05 0.5
Total 41.0 46.1 66.3
Source: Authors’ data.
FDI = foreign direct investment
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the FDI flows, it is assumed that each sector has a demand for capital as 
a function of sectoral production and factor prices. The capital market 
sums up demands across sectors and sets demand equal to supply to 
determine the rate of return on capital. So, an inflow of FDI expands 
the capital stock. The increase in the capital stock is then allocated 
across sectors to equate the marginal value product across sectors. The 
results of the FDI inflows are indicated in Table 23. With a 1 percent 
increase in Korea’s capital stock, Korea’s welfare increases by $19.3 
billion (2.62 percent of GDP); and with a 5 percent increase, Korea’s 
welfare increases by $59.4 billion (8.05 percent of GDP). These results 
compare with a welfare increase for Korea of $9.3 billion (1.26 percent 
of GDP), assuming no FDI as in our basic comparative static scenario. 
Welfare declines in some cases, reflecting the declines in capital stocks 
that provide for the FDI flows.
What is suggested by the foregoing exercise is that the benefits of 
an FTA could be much larger if capital stocks are assumed to increase 
compared with the benefits of the bilateral removal of existing trade 
barriers. It is difficult to determine, however, how likely this may be 
in reality.
Conclusions
We have had occasion in Chapter 2 and in the preceding discussion in 
this chapter to offer a number of criticisms of the results based on the 
GTAP conceptual framework that has been used in a number of studies 
of a Korea-U.S. FTA. It is unfortunately difficult to make comprehensive 
comparisons between the detailed results of the GTAP and Michigan 
models because of their conceptual differences, parameter differences, 
and differences in the level of aggregation and the base-period data used. 
We acknowledge that the Michigan Model does not represent the last 
word when it comes to modeling trade liberalization, but we offer our 
computational analysis and results in the hope that they will provide a 
comprehensive and informative representation of the likely economic 
effects of a Korea-U.S. FTA.
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Computational Analysis of
Alternative Negotiating Options
Having analyzed the economic effects of a bilateral Korea-U.S. FTA, 
we now compare U.S. and Korean economic interests for other FTAs 
that the two nations have negotiated or are in progress of negotiating, 
and how and whether their interests would be more or less enhanced by 
unilateral free trade and global (multilateral) free trade compared with 
the adoption of bilateral FTAs. The welfare comparisons are indicated 
in Table 24.
Korean FTAs
The first column in Table 24 summarizes the welfare effects of the 
Korea-U.S. FTA and below this the welfare effects of the actual and 
potential bilateral FTAs between Korea and a number of partner coun-
tries, including Canada, Chile, Japan, Mexico, and Singapore.22 It is 
evident that Korea’s welfare gain from a Korea-U.S. FTA of $9.3 billion 
is considerably greater than any of the other FTAs listed. The global 
welfare increase of $41.0 billion from a Korea-U.S. FTA is similarly 
greater than the increases of the other FTAs.
The third column in Table 24 indicates the welfare effects of a 
Korea-ASEAN FTA. Korea’s welfare gain of $8.7 billion is similar to 
the gain from a Korea-U.S. FTA. The global welfare gain of $33.2 bil-
lion is less than the $41.0 increase from a Korea-U.S. FTA.
22. For further analyses and details, see Cheong (2002) and McKibbin, Lee, 
and Cheong (2004).
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U.S. FTAs
The second column in Table 24 summarizes the welfare effects of some 
selected U.S. bilateral FTAs, including those with Australia, Chile, and 
Singapore that are now operative and one with Thailand that is being 
negotiated. The United States has also been negotiating bilateral FTAs 
with several additional countries, including Bahrain, Central America 
and the Dominican Republic, Colombia, Israel, Jordan, and Morocco, 
and is currently negotiating FTAs with Malaysia, Oman, Panama, Peru, 
Table 24: Computation of Welfare Effects of Bilateral FTAs, 
Unilateral Free Trade, and Global Free Trade (billions of dollars 
and percentage)
Bilateral Free Trade Bilateral Free Trade (continued)
Korea-U.S.
Welfare
Australia-U.S.
Welfare
(U.S.$)
(% of 
GDP) (U.S.$)
(% of 
GDP)
United States 25.1 0.1 United States 15.7 0.1
Korea 9.3 1.3 Australia 3.8 0.6
Global 41.0 Global 18.1
Canada-Korea
Welfare
Chile-U.S.
Welfare
(U.S.$)
(% of 
GDP) (U.S.$)
(% of 
GDP)
Canada 1.8 0.1 United States 5.5 0.0
Korea 2.0 0.3 Chile 1.0 0.9
Global 4.1 Global 6.4
Chile-Korea
Welfare
Singapore-U.S.
Welfare
(U.S.$)
(% of 
GDP) (U.S.$)
(% of 
GDP)
Chile 0.4 0.3 United States 13.0 0.1
Korea 0.5 0.1 Singapore 2.0 1.5
Global 0.7 Global 16.1
Japan-Korea
Welfare
Thailand-U.S.
Welfare
(U.S.$)
(% of 
GDP) (U.S.$)
(% of 
GDP)
Japan 15.7 0.2 United States 12.4 0.1
Korea 2.2 0.3 Thailand 5.0 2.5
Global 18.4 Global 16.3
Korea-Mexico
Welfare
Unilateral Free Trade(U.S.$)
(% of 
GDP)
Mexico 2.2 0.2
United States
Welfare
Korea 2.1 0.3
(U.S.$)
(% of 
GDP)
Global 3.0 United States 358.9 2.0
Korea-Singapore
Welfare Global 471.8
(U.S.$)
(% of 
GDP)
Korea
Welfare
Singapore 0.5 0.3
(U.S.$)
(% of 
GDP)
Korea 0.9 0.1 Korea 33.8 4.6
Global 1.8 Global 92.4
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the Southern African Customs Union, and the United Arab Emirates.23 
Looking at the welfare estimates for only the four countries in compari-
son with the Korea-U.S. FTA, the welfare increase for the United States 
of $25.1 billion for the Korea-U.S. FTA is substantially greater than the 
increase for any of the other four countries indicated. This is the case as 
well for the global welfare increase of $41.0 billion for the Korea-U.S. 
FTA compared with the other bilateral FTAs. These conclusions would 
hold for any of the other bilateral FTAs mentioned.
The third column of Table 24 lists the welfare effects of regional 
free trade represented by the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). 
The U.S. welfare increase of $73.0 billion from the FTAA is about three 
times greater than the gain from the bilateral Korea-U.S. FTA.
Table 24: Computation of Welfare Effects of Bilateral FTAs, 
Unilateral Free Trade, and Global Free Trade (billions of dollars 
and percentage) (continued)
Regional Free Trade Global Free Trade
Korea+ASEAN
Welfare Welfare
(U.S.$)
(% of 
GDP) (U.S.$)
(% of 
GDP)
Indonesia 4.5 1.8 United States 614.3 3.4
Malaysia 5.1 3.3 Korea 86.1 11.7
Philippines 2.2 1.8 Global 2,857.7
Singapore 3.1 2.2 Global Free Trade: Decomposition
Thailand 4.0 2.0
Agricultural 
protection
Welfare
Vietnam 0.8 1.4
(U.S.$)
(% of 
GDP)
Korea 8.7 1.2 United States 19.5 0.1
Global 33.2 Korea -1.9 -0.3
FTAA
Welfare Global 7.8
(U.S.$)
(% of 
GDP) Manufactures 
tariffs
Welfare
United States 73.0 0.4
(U.S.$)
(% of 
GDP)
Canada 6.2 0.5 United States 85.2 0.5
Mexico 11.9 1.1 Korea 52.3 7.1
Argentina 10.7 2.2 Global 965.0
Brazil 13.5 1.5
Services barriers
Welfare
Chile 4.0 3.5
(U.S.$)
(% of 
GDP)
Colombia 2.3 2.4 United States 509.6 2.8
Peru 2.9 1.3 Korea 35.7 4.8
Uruguay 0.8 2.3 Global 1,885.0
Rest of FTAA 15.9 2.6
Global 130.1
Source: Authors’ data.
23. For detailed computational analyses of several U.S. FTAs, see Brown, 
Kiyota, and Stern (2005a, 2005b, 2006a, 2006b).
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U.S. and Korean Unilateral Liberalization
The bottom of the second column of Table 24 shows the welfare gains 
from unilateral free trade undertaken individually by the United States. 
The increase in U.S. welfare with unilateral free trade of $358.9 billion 
is much greater than the increase associated with any of the U.S. bilat-
eral and regional FTAs shown in the table. This is the case as well for 
the increase in global welfare with U.S. unilateral free trade. Similarly, 
Korea’s welfare increase with unilateral free trade of $33.8 billion is 
greater than the welfare increases of any of the FTAs listed individually 
and in total.
Global (Multilateral) Free Trade
The last column of Table 24 shows the welfare effects of global free 
trade. U.S. welfare rises by $614.3 billion, and Korea’s welfare rises by 
$86.1 billion. Global welfare rises by $2.9 trillion. The welfare benefits 
of global free trade are therefore much greater than the benefits to be 
derived from the bilateral FTAs, regional FTAs, and from unilateral free 
trade for both the United States and Korea. It can also be seen that most 
of the welfare gains from global free trade come from the elimination 
of manufactures tariffs and services barriers.
These calculations clearly show that multilateral trade liberalization 
offers potentially far greater increases in economic welfare for the United 
States, Korea, their FTA partner countries, and the other countries or 
regions that are covered in the global trading system. This is the case 
even if there would be less than complete free trade globally. That is, 
if existing trade barriers in the ongoing Doha Development Agenda 
negotiations were to be reduced, for example, by one-third or one-half, 
the resulting global and national gains would be proportionally lower. 
But these welfare gains but would still far exceed the welfare gains from 
the FTAs noted and the gains from the possible adoption of unilateral 
free trade by the United States and Korea. This would almost certainly 
remain true even if there are other benefits stemming from the FTAs that 
have not been taken into account in the Michigan Model simulations.
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Conclusions and Implications 
for Further Research and Policy
We have noted that the United States and Korea have a variety of 
economic and political motivations in pursuing an FTA. In this con-
nection, the present study has been designed to assess the economic 
effects involved in such an agreement. The Korea-U.S. FTA negotiations 
were initiated in May 2006 and are ongoing. It is hoped to conclude 
the negotiations and sign the agreement prior to the expiration of the 
president’s negotiating authority in mid-2007.
The computational analysis presented has been based on the Michi-
gan Model of World Production and Trade, which is a multicountry, 
multisector computable general equilibrium (CGE) model that has 
been used for more than three decades to provide estimates of the 
economic effects of multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade negotia-
tions and other aspects of changes in trade policies of the United States 
and other major trading countries or regions. The version of the model 
used covers 27 economic sectors, including agriculture, manufactures, 
and services, in each of 30 countries or regions. The distinguishing 
feature of the Michigan Model is that it incorporates elements of the 
New Trade Theory, including increasing returns to scale, monopolistic 
competition, and product variety. The data for the model are based on 
version 6.0 of the GTAP database for 2001 together with data derived 
from other sources.
The United States uses a common framework covering the issues 
to be negotiated in each of its bilateral FTA negotiations. This frame-
work, which is patterned after NAFTA, negotiated in 1992–93, has been 
updated and adapted for the new FTAs. The main negotiating issues in 
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the FTAs cover bilateral removal of tariffs and other barriers to trade 
in agricultural products, manufactures, and services; rules of origin; 
intellectual property rights; worker rights; environmental standards; 
investment; government procurement; customs administration and 
trade facilitation; trade remedies; and dispute settlement procedures. 
The actual negotiations are adapted to reflect the particular conditions 
and interests of the United States and partner countries.
We had occasion to review a number of previous studies that re-
viewed the important bilateral issues of concern to the two countries in 
the FTA negotiations and to assess the economic effects involved. The 
economic assessments in these studies were based on the GTAP model-
ing framework in which it is assumed that there is perfect competition, 
constant returns to scale, and that products are distinguished by country 
of production (Armington assumption). We had some reservations with 
the GTAP framework that related in particular to the use and interpre-
tation of the Armington assumption and the handling of employment 
changes.
In using the Michigan Model, our focus has been on the effects 
of the bilateral removal of trade barriers, which lend themselves most 
readily to quantification. The nontrade aspects of the FTAs may also be 
important, but they are intrinsically more difficult to incorporate into a 
modeling framework. Although we have made some allowance for pos-
sible increases in FDI that may be induced over time as the consequence 
of the Korea-U.S. FTA, no allowance has been made for improvements 
in productivity that could result from the FTA. Because of the foregoing 
limitations, the computational results presented for the bilateral FTAs are 
therefore best interpreted as providing a lower bound for the potential 
benefits involved. Because these benefits are shown mostly to be rather 
small for Korea and the United States in both absolute and relative terms, 
the nontrade and other benefits of the Korea-U.S. FTA are unlikely to 
alter these results significantly.
Although the bilateral FTA removal of trade barriers would be 
phased in annually for some products and sectors, it is assumed for 
modeling purposes that all of the barriers are removed at the same time 
and entered as inputs into the model for the policy changes involved. The 
model is then solved computationally to represent the percent changes in 
the variables of interest and to calculate the absolute changes in employ-
ment by sector. Because full employment is assumed, the employment 
results presented indicate the shifts in sectoral employment that will 
occur with bilateral liberalization. Some sectors will have increases 
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in employment, others will have decreases, and there is no change in 
employment overall.
The Korea-U.S. FTA is shown to increase Korea’s economic wel-
fare by $9.28 billion (1.26 percent of GDP), with $4.48 billion coming 
from the bilateral removal of manufactures barriers and $5.46 billion 
from bilateral removal of the services barriers. U.S. economic welfare 
is increased by $25.12 billion (0.14 percent of GDP), with $7.27 billion 
coming from elimination of manufactures tariffs and $19.20 billion 
from elimination of services barriers. Global economic welfare rises 
by $41.04 billion. There is evidence of trade diversion for nonmember 
countries, but the welfare reductions are small. U.S. employment is 
increased in its agricultural sectors and food, beverages, and tobacco 
and is reduced in textiles and wearing apparel, metal products, trans-
portation equipment, and services. But these employment changes are 
relatively small in percentage terms based on the initial employment 
levels. Korea’s employment increases are concentrated in rice, livestock, 
textiles, wearing apparel, leather and leather products, and transporta-
tion equipment. Its employment declines are noteworthy in a number of 
the other agricultural sectors, manufactures, and services. Some of the 
employment changes are fairly large in percentage terms and indicate 
that there may significant adjustment problems in the Korean labor 
market, depending on how rapidly the bilateral removal of the trade 
barriers would take place.
To provide some perspective on the results of the FTAs, the model 
was also used to calculate the effects of unilateral tariff removal by 
Korea and the United States. Unilateral free trade would result in much 
larger increases in economic welfare for Korea and the United States 
than the bilateral FTAs. Finally, the effects of global (multilateral) free 
trade were calculated and shown to be far greater for Korea and the 
United States compared with the bilateral FTAs. It is possible that there 
may be some significant benefits to Korea and the United States from 
the negotiation of the trade and nontrade aspects of the Korea-U.S. 
FTA that are not captured by the modeling framework. Nonetheless, 
the computational results of unilateral and multilateral trade liberaliza-
tion suggest that much greater increases in economic welfare could 
be gained from more broadly based trade liberalization than from the 
bilateral Korea-U.S. FTA.
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Appendix:
Sensitivity Analysis
This appendix reports on sensitivity analysis of the Michigan Model. 
There are three key elasticities or parameters in the model: the elasticity 
of substitution among varieties, which is exogenously set at 3; the param-
eter that measures the sensitivity that consumers have to the number of 
varieties, which is set at 0.5; and the elasticities of supply that are taken 
from the literature. The variety parameter can take on values between 
zero and 1. The larger it is, it means that consumers value variety more. 
If the parameter is set at zero, consumers have no preference for variety. 
This would correspond to the Armington assumption, according to which 
consumers view products depending on their place of production. To 
analyze the sensitivity of our model results, we have experimented with 
different values of the elasticity of substitution among varieties and the 
consumer sensitivity to the number of varieties. The following tests were 
conducted: (1) increase the elasticity of substitution among varieties by 
10 percent, holding other parameters constant; (2) decrease the elastic-
ity of substitution by 10 percent, holding other parameters constant; (3) 
increase the consumption varieties parameter by 10 percent, holding 
other parameters constant; and (4) decrease the consumption varieties 
by 10 percent, holding other parameters constant.
The results, which are available on request, are not very sensitive 
to the alternative parameters of the consumption varieties. That is, a 10 
percent increase (decrease) in these parameters yields only less than 
0.1 percentage point larger (smaller) welfare effects compared with the 
baseline model. The sensitivity to the changes in the elasticity of sub-
stitution is large compared with the results of differences in the variety 
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parameters. In Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (2000), sensitivity tests 
reveal that the model may exaggerate the likely gains from economies 
of scale owing to trade liberalization in the context of expansion of the 
NAFTA. But the error is small in this context because the impact of trade 
liberalization is small. When econometric estimates of scale economies 
are incorporated into the model, the welfare gains owing to capital flows 
are shown to remain robust.
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